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In the early 1960s the civil rights movement challenged the estab-
lished legal order in dramatic and profound ways. The movement
attacked laws and practices that denied blacks equality, tested our
commitment to freedom of speech, and questioned the very struc-
tures-such as federalism-that determined who was to hear grievances
of civil rights claimants.
One grievance related to state criminal statutes. The movement
claimed that certain of these statutes unconstitutionally interfered
with organizational activity on behalf of racial equality. The move-
ment demanded access to the federal trial courts to challenge these
statutes and to obtain injunctive relief against their enforcement.
Access seemed imperative if the drive for racial equality was to main-
tain its momentum, and yet the inherited rule denied access, remit-
ting the citizen to the state courts, where he could raise his constitu-
tional challenge by way of a defense to a criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court responded to this challenge in Dombrowski
v. Pfister' and chose the side of access; it opened the doors of the
federal trial courts. That case expressed the Warren Court's activism
and its determination to protect the civil rights movement. Even
more, that case promised-in its own special way-a new era for the
federal injunction.
Earlier cases had used the doctrines of equity, most notably the
requirement that the alternative remedies at law be demonstrated in-
adequate before an injunction is granted, to limit the availability of
the federal injunction. These precedents were not repudiated by
Dombrowski, but rather distinguished, circumscribed, and made un-
availing. The linkage between the two realms of discourse-federalism
and equity-was preserved and yet the equitable doctrines were re-
interpreted. They were made to bend to a new vision of federalism,
one that posited the federal courts as the primary guardian of con-
stitutional rights. The foundations for radical reform of the federal
judicial structure were thereby laid, though in a quiet, statesmanlike
manner.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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This essay will trace the career of Dombrowski over the next dec-
ade, but I must first make explicit my complicated relationship to
the case. I clerked for its author, Justice Brennan. I write with deep
personal ties to the Justice, with enormous admiration for him, and
with his lessons well in mind. Justice Brennan was a master teacher;
he was generous with his time and made certain that his clerks saw
the judicial process at the closest possible range. The Justice cannot,
however, be held responsible for anything I say about the case or the
strategy that it implies. Dombrowski was decided in the Term before
my clerkship, and, as best as I can remember, we did not discuss it.
But no one could miss its importance to the Justice, to the Court,
and to federalism.
In the years immediately following my clerkship, I was involved in
civil rights litigation and lived with Dombrowski on the front line.
Dombrowski was at the core of many of our litigative strategies, and
that strengthened my attachment to the case, if not my understanding
of it. My fascination with the case continued when I later became an
academic, but my perspective changed. Dombrowski was not just an
exercise of judicial power, not just a lawyer's tool, but an object of
study to be tested by the rigors of intellectual inquiry. I continued to
believe that the theory of federalism overthrown by Dombrowski was
wrong, and yet I was troubled by Dombrowski's method, its refusal to
articulate explicitly the new vision of federalism and its acceptance of
the tradition that used the language of equity to express the values of
federalism. That method was undoubtedly dictated by the necessity of
forging a majority position, and yet that did not quell my doubts. I
was troubled by the questions that must plague all clerks-turned-
professors, those concerning the limits of judicial statesmanship: Was
it consistent with a proper conception of the judicial role? Did it
create its own vulnerabilities?
At the outset, these questions did not bear heavily on me. But year
after year, just as I was finishing my lectures on Dombrowski, the
Supreme Court would announce a new decision mooting the lectures
and, not so incidentally, seeming to drain Dombrowski of any vitality.
By the spring of 1976, Dombrowski seemed only a formal vestige of
another era. Even the era seemed remote and inaccessible to my
students. The more remarkable fact was that this retrenchment of the
1970s seemed to be occurring along doctrinal bridges that Dombrowski
had built. The questions of method pressed more heavily. I wondered
why Dombrowski had not separated the two realms of discourse,
federalism and equity, and had not addressed openly the values of
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federalism that were at the core of its meaning; I questioned whether
the very statesmanlike quality of Dombrowski, manifested by its in-
direction, had facilitated its own demise. I want to use this essay-the
substance of my lectures at Yale in the spring of 1976--to reflect upon
these questions of method as well as to develop an analytical frame-
work for thinking about injunctions and federalism.
I
The plaintiffs in Dombrowski were engaged in civil rights activity
in Louisiana in the early 1960s. They were being prosecuted under
the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and
the Communist Propaganda Control Law,3 and they turned to a federal
court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint alleged
that the statutes were facially overbroad in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the threats of their enforcement
were part of a plan of harassment, evidenced by unlawful raids and
seizures of records, to discourage civil rights activity in Louisiana.
4
In 1965 the liberal bloc on the Warren Court was its strongest, yet
there were few votes to spare. On the question of access to the federal
courts, civil rights litigants could generally count on the Chief Justice,
Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, and Justice Frankfurter's replace-
ment, Justice Goldberg. But after that the going was uncertain. One
could not expect a favorable vote from Justice Harlan, and the same
might be said of Justice Clark. Justice Black did not participate in
Dombrowski, though his views on the question-as publicly revealed
later-were no doubt known to his colleagues and felt by the Court.
There was a hope of obtaining the votes of Justice White and Justice
Stewart.
The Chief Justice assigned the task of formulating the Court posi-
tion to Justice Brennan-a pattern to repeat itself countless times for
the Warren Court. Justice Brennan was quite aware of the technical
issue posed by the request for affirmative relief. "[Cjonsiderations of
federalism," he wrote, "have tempered the exercise of equitable power,
for the Court has recognized that federal interference with a State's
2. I am grateful to my students at Yale, and before that at Chicago, for their af-
fectionate stubbornness, for their criticism and encouragement. I particularly wish to
thank two of those students, Jack Schwartz, who with grace and perspective made the
initial transition from spoken to written word, and Robert Post, who made the editing
process a marvellous intellectual adventure.
3. 380 U.S. at 482 n.1.
4. Id. at 481-82, 487-89.
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good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent
with our federal framework." The precedent that most exemplified
this version of federalism was Douglas v. City of Jeannette.0
Douglas involved an ordinance of the City of Jeannette prohibiting
solicitation without a license. The Court was asked to review the
district court's dismissal of a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the
ordinance against Jehovah's Witnesses. In a case decided the same
day, Murdock v. Pennsylvania,7 the Court had held that the ordinance
violated the First Amendment when applied to the Witnesses. In
Douglas, therefore, one might have expected the Court to affirm (or
possibly vacate and remand) on the theory that the Murdock declara-
tion of unconstitutionality made an injunction against the enforce-
ment of the ordinance unnecessary; the plaintiffs could not demon-
strate any likelihood of a future wrong. The Court could have reasoned
that its decision in Murdock radically changed the picture as it might
have existed at the time the Douglas suit was filed or at the time the
district court acted; now there was no reason to assume the ordinance
would be enforced against the Witnesses.8 This tack would have kept
the case at a low visibility, but the Court chose to affirm on a much
more ambitious theory.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court, discerned in § 2283, the
Anti-Injunction Act, 9 a congressional policy against federal court in-
terference with "threatened proceedings in state courts save in those
exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity
to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent." This
policy was reinforced by the "familiar rule that courts of equity do
not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions." Such a prosecution
afforded an adequate alternate remedy at law to the constitutionally
aggrieved defendant, for "the lawfulness or constitutionality of the
statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be de-
termined as readily in the criminal case as in a suit for an injunc-
tion."' 0
Douglas was thus a statement about the structure of American
federalism cast in the language of equity. Douglas claimed both that
5. Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
6. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
7. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
8. The deliberate quality of the Douglas theory is evidenced by the fact that the
opinion acknowledged the availability of this theory. 319 U.S. at 165.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970): "A court of the United States may not grant an in-
junction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."
10. 319 U.S. at 163.
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a vital principle of federalism was threatened by the injunctive suit,
and that the doctrines of equity should be used to protect that prin-
ciple. It was vulnerable on both grounds.
Douglas sought to curtail access to federal trial courts to protect, as
Chief Justice Stone had once phrased it, "the rightful independence of
state governments."" For Justice Brennan, however, this vision of
federalism was wholly inconsistent with the revision of federal juris-
diction that had occurred after the Civil War and that had given the
citizen the right to choose which forum-state or federal-would best
adjudicate his grievance against the state.12 As the Justice was to say
much later, "[O]ne of the strengths of our federal system is that it
provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.
Federalism is not served when the federal half of that protection is
crippled."' 3
Justice Brennan was not unaware that the independence of state
governments was affected by federal injunctive relief, but for him
Murdock and not Douglas made the more basic and more correct point
about federal structure: the states are bound by federal law, including
the Bill of Rights, and the ultimate power to determine the con-
sistency of state laws with superior federal norms is allocated to a
federal court, the Supreme Court of the United States. Interference
with state governments was thus endemic to the federal structure. For
Justice Brennan, federalism was a functioning institution, not an
abstract co-existence of mutually impermeable spheres of sovereignty.
Douglas v. City of Jeannette could also be faulted for its use of
doctrines of equity-doctrines forged in the battles of English Chancery
-to further views of federalism, a political principle central to Amer-
ican government. The linguistic borrowing was a kind of legal
prestidigitation. A verbal formula, such as the irreparable injury re-
quirement, suggests that a point is being made about remedies, when
in truth a point is being made about the structure of the federal sys-
tem, one that stands independent of the remedy.
Justice Brennan, however, chose to bore from within. He recognized
that both the vision of federalism and the linguistic borrowing of
11. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932). Chief Justice Stone cited this
language with approval a few weeks after Douglas in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298 (1943).
12. For the articulation of this view, see the Justice's opinions in Perez v. Ledesma,
401 U.S. 82, 106-10 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245-49 (1967).
13. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489, 503 (1977). This language was later quoted by the Justice in dissent in
Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1223 (1977).
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Douglas were deeply entrenched, part of a long tradition, 14 and he
chose to attack the precedent by indirection. He neither stated his
views of federalism explicitly, nor did he attack the language of
Chancery in which Douglas cast the issues. Rather he accepted that
language and construed it to express his vision of federalism. He
took up each of the obstacles to access defined by Douglas-§ 2283,
imminence, and irreparable injurys-and one by one demonstrated
how they could be surmounted.
The first obstacle was § 2283, which provided that a federal court
"may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."'1
Unlike Chief Justice Stone, Justice Brennan chose to view this statute
not as a source of policy, but rather as a technical barrier. Section
2283 had to be confronted because, by the time Dombrowski reached
the Supreme Court, there were state grand jury indictments pending
against the plaintiffs.
14. On Stone's particular fondness for borrowing from equity, see Gardner, Mr. Chief
Justice Stone, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1203, 1207 n.7 (1946); and Leventhal, Harlan Fiske
Stone, 49 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 24, 58-59 (1977).
15. Dombrowski separately addressed a fourth obstacle-abstention. I do not specifically
deal with it in this essay because: (a) it has its roots in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941), rather than Douglas v. City of Jeannette, and it is not specially tied to
injunctions; (b) Pullman abstention is confined to a very narrow category of situations,
when a state court can by statutory construction obviate the need for a constitutional
judgment, see, e.g., Procunier v.. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 402-03 (1974); Lake Carriers'
Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-13 (1972); (c) much of the discussion in Dorn.
browski under the rubric of abstention was, despite subsequent disclaimers to the
contrary (see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 n.17 (1967)), really a discussion of
irreparable injury. Justice Brennan stated that in the case where overbroad criminal
statutes were chilling First Amendment rights, abstention was inappropriate when "no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in
a single prosecution." 380 U.S. at 491. The same point can be made about this reasoning
that I will ultimately make about Justice Brennan's analysis of the irreparable injury
requirement: had the Dombrowski Court been committed to values presumably served
by the abstention doctrine, something I strongly doubt, it might have considered the
possible limiting construction to be gained from a state declaratory judgment or in-
junctive proceeding (as, indeed, Justice Brennan suggested in order to decide whether
the statute in Dombrowski might be subsequently revived, see p. 1114 infra).
In years following Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the term "abstention" was
sometimes used to describe the rule of that case-a denial of federal court access when
a state prosecution is pending. Younger abstention is distinguished from Pullman absten-
tion because of its theoretical roots (Pulman abstention serves not only states rights,
but also the policy expressed in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 298 (1936),
of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication); because of the separate conditions
of its applicability (Younger abstention is appropriate when there is a pending prosecu-
tion, Pullman abstention when there is available a limiting state construction); and
because Younger dictates the dismissal of the federal suit while Pullman requires a
retention of jurisdiction during the parallel state proceedings. See Field, Abstention in
Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
1071, 1163-87 (1974).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
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The Court could have held that § 1983,17 the civil rights statute
upon which the Dombrowski suit was founded, was an "expressly au-
thorized" exception to § 2283. Literalism and a true appreciation of
the significance of the post-Civil War reconstitution would support
such an argument. But there was apprehension that if § 1983 were
an exception to the statute, the exception would swallow the rule,
for § 1983 is as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment itself. This
apprehension was revealed by the sharp division of the courts of ap-
peal on the issue.'8 The Court resolved to avoid a decision on the
issue in Dombrowski.
Justice Brennan was thus forced to seek other ways to avoid the
§ 2283 ban. In footnote 2 of Dombrowski he advanced two reasons:
(1) at the time of the filing of the federal complaint, grand jury in-
dictments against Dombrowski had not yet been obtained, so "no
state 'proceedings' were pending within the intendment of § 2283";
(2) in any event the subsequently obtained indictments were tainted
because a temporary restraining order against the state prosecutions
had been improperly dissolved.' 9
Both of these reasons appear weak. If § 2283 expresses a significant
federal policy against federal court intrusion into state processes, the
"relevant time" should not be limited to the moment the complaint
was filed, but rather it should be any point in the federal litigative
process. As for the erroneously dissolved temporary restraining order,
it is hard to see why, if § 2283 is really of jurisdictional import, its
application should turn on the question of the restraining order at
all, especially since the characterization of a decision to deny or
dissolve a temporary restraining order as "erroneous" turns on tests
peculiar to temporary restraining orders, tests which are only par-
tially dependent upon the merits of the underlying claim and wholly
unrelated to the concerns of federalism.
20
Aside from the merits of these arguments, we should also note that
Justice Brennan's chronological treatment of § 2283 carried an im-
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
18. Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1950) with Smith v.
Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 1957).
19. 380 U.S. at 484 n.2. Justice Brennan possibly could have offered a third reason for
escaping the ban of § 2283. He might have argued that the doctrine of Leiter Minerals,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957), which made suits brought by the United States
an exception to § 2283, should have been extended to civil rights litigants who, under
the theory of their complaint, were not interested in their own individual welfare, but
were trying to vindicate a national interest. See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360
F.2d 692, 696-98 (2d Cir. 1966). Such a theory, however, would have eviscerated the
statute and thus would have been no more appealing than declaring § 1983 an exception
to § 2283.
20. See 0. Fiss, INJUNcriONS 168-70 (1972).
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portant negative implication. Because he fastened on the time at which
the federal complaint was filed as the relevant time for § 2283, he
implied that if the state prosecutor won the race to the courthouse and
obtained his indictment before the federal plaintiff filed his complaint,
§ 2283 would bar federal relief. The secrecy of grand juries and the
stealthy use of criminal informations gave prosecutors an enormous
advantage in such a race. No one knew when the prosecutor began.
This difficulty was compounded by the second requirement of
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, that to receive injunctive relief a plaintiff
must show that the injury which he seeks to prevent is imminent. The
requirement was well rooted in equity practice.2 1 Despite or perhaps
because of the fact that the plaintiffs in Dombrowski could easily
demonstrate imminent harm-they had been indicted under the
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law-Justice
Brennan carefully preserved Douglas's rule of equity. Having just
invalidated two sections of the Subversive Activities and Communist
Control Law because their procedures and presumptions were con-
stitutionally infirm, Justice Brennan in footnote 13 declined to con-
sider plaintiffs' constitutional attack on the Communist Propaganda
Control Law. It was uncertain, Justice Brennan said, whether plain-
tiffs' records had been seized under color of that law; a determina-
tion as to its constitutionality "should await determination by the
District Court after considering the sufficiency of threats to enforce
the law."22 The harm from the enforcement of this act, in other words,
was not demonstrably imminent.
This analysis seems artificial. In light of the entire pattern of
Louisiana's law enforcement against Dombrowski and his associates, a
genuine threat existed that this statute would also be enforced. More
than that, the failure to consider the constitutionality of this statute
was at odds with one of the central props of the whole opinion, the spe-
cial vulnerability of precious First Amendment rights to the "chilling
effect" of prosecutions. If the very possibility of a prosecution dis-
couraged political activity and compelled the interdiction of the Com-
munist Control Law, it seems inconsistent to claim that the attack on
the Communist Propaganda Law was premature and should await
further threats of enforcement. The strain in the logic reveals the
strategic quality of footnote 13, as does the nominal quality of the
restraint. The Court had already used the test of Speiser v. Randall
2 3
21. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688 (1885).
22. 380 U.S. at 496 n.13.
23. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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to invalidate the registration requirement of Louisiana's Subversive
Activities and Communist Control Law,2 4 and application of the same
test would have been sufficient to invalidate the identical provision in
the Communist Propaganda Control Law.2 This would have been a
small step indeed.
Seen by itself the application of the imminency requirement might
have been of no moment-a very minor concession. But as I have al-
ready suggested it cannot be seen by itself. It must be placed alongside
the first avoidance strategy-the chronological gloss of § 2283. Together
they placed the civil rights litigant in a squeeze play. If he sought
federal injunctive relief too soon, the imminency requirement would
defeat the action; if he waited too long, the prosecutor might have
brought charges barring equitable relief under § 2283. In the years im-
mediately following Dombrowski, this problem did not seem acute,
perhaps because Brennan's treatment of imminency in footnote 13 was
sotto voce.2 1 Yet in later cases the advantage to the prosecutor was
enhanced when the Court elevated the imminency requirement to
constitutional dimensions and gave it an unintended stringency.2T The
litigant was forced to wait, virtually to the point when a prosecution
was commenced, when he could be faulted for being too late.
The third potential obstacle to access, the irreparable injury require-
ment, was the core of the Douglas decision. The case had held that a
defense to a criminal prosecution was an adequate remedy at law and
thus that a federal plaintiff subject to criminal prosecution was not
facing irreparable injury. Justice Brennan accepted the equitable
premise, that the federal injunction should be available only if a
criminal defense were an inadequate remedy, and yet he circumvented
its effect by linking the concept of irreparable injury to the particular
characteristics of a First Amendment claim. Because First Amendment
rights are both special and fragile, defense to a criminal prosecution
24. The Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law required registra-
tion of "Communist front" organizations, and provided that if an organization were so
identified by the Attorney General of the United States, by the federal Subversive
Activities Control Board, or by a congressional committee, it was presumptively to be so
classified for Louisiana purposes. The Court held this scheme invalid under the rule of
Speiser v. Randall, id. at 526, quoted in 380 U.S. at 496: "Where the transcendent value
of speech is involved, due process certainly requires . . . that the State bear the burden
of persuasion .... "
25. Justice Brennan noted that the definition of "communist propaganda" in the
Louisiana Communist Propaganda Control Law contained "a presumption identical to
that which we have found to be invalid" in the provision regarding communist front
organizations. 380 U.S. at 496 n.13.
26. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. Rav. 535, 580-84 (1970).
27. See pp. 1118-19, 1133, 1135, 1152 infra.
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is an inadequate means of protecting them when the federal plaintiff
claims they are threatened by an overbroad statute or by bad-faith
harassment.2
8
It is crucial, especially in view of the way in which Dombrowski
was subsequently to be rewritten, to understand the logical relation-
ship between the two claims of overbreadth and bad-faith harass-
ment and the irreparable injury requirement. For this purpose, the
procedural posture of Dombrowski is revealing. The case reached the
Supreme Court on the appeal of a dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint
for failure to state a claim. There was no evidentiary record before
the Court, only the pleadings. An overbreadth claim can be ad-
judicated on the pleadings because it is a pure law question, not
implicating factual issues. This is not true of the claim of bad-
faith harassment, which is critically dependent on factual assertions.
The Court ordered the issuance of the injunction on the basis of the
pleadings alone, and from that it is fair to assume that the injunction
was issued on the basis of the overbreadth claim. Only in the context
of its direction to the district court to frame a specific decree did it
order an evidentiary hearing on the bad-faith harassment issue. There-
fore Dombrowski, as much through this procedural mime as through
the words of the opinion, identified overbreadth and bad-faith harass-
ment as independently sufficient grounds for rendering a criminal
defense an inadequate remedy at law.
The central contribution of Dombrowski was its linkage of ir-
reparable injury and the doctrine of overbreadth. The doctrine,
largely revived and developed in the 1960s by Justice Brennan in
another civil rights case, NAACP v. Button,29 permitted a statute to
be invalidated when challenged under the First Amendment because
of its inhibition of constitutionally protected activity. To connect the
doctrine with irreparable injury, Justice Brennan relied on two
unique aspects of the overbreadth claim. First, the doctrine imported
a novel conception of standing. A plaintiff who charged that a statute
was overbroad need not himself have established that his own activity
would have been protected by the First Amendment; he could seek
an injunction invalidating the statute on behalf of those who were
protected. This loosened concept of standing rested upon the premise
that fragile First Amendment rights would suffer unless the validity
of the facially overbroad statute could be adjudged in the earliest
possible case, regardless of whether the particular litigant was on one
28. 380 U.S. at 490-92.
29. 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
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side or the other of the constitutional line of demarcation. Second,
under the overbreadth doctrine a victorious plaintiff would gain a
judgment invalidating a statute on its face-in all its applications-
instead of a focused judgment that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied.
The overbreadth doctrine thus functioned to protect free expression
as a "transcendent value to all society and not merely to those exercis-
ing their rights." 30 In Dombrowski Justice Brennan linked the concept
of irreparable injury to this societal value. He hypothesized that a de-
fense to a criminal prosecution was atomistic and thus unable to
provide the broad protection needed for First Amendment rights. The
result of a criminal trial determined at most whether or not a statute
was unconstitutional as applied. If the activity of the individual de-
fendant were found to be constitutionally protected, he would be
acquitted; if not, he would be convicted. Perhaps after a long series of
prosecutions the constitutional contours of the statute might be ham-
mered out; but even then the criminal process would not be providing
the litigant with the means to vindicate quickly and effectively the
social right to free expression. Moreover, the criminal process was
segmented. The constitutional issue could remain undecided if, for
example, charges were dismissed for lack of evidence. Finally, the very
defensive character of the alternative remedy contributed to its in-
adequacy. In situations unlike that in Dombrowski, where criminal
prosecutions were only threatened, the threat could effectively chill
First Amendment rights, and yet the citizen would have no power to
obtain that remedy.
On this account the criminal defense did seem inadequate for the
protection of First Amendment rights, and the bar erected by Douglas
v. City of Jeannette had to fall. Dombrowski thus appeared as a tour
de force-precedent was preserved but gutted. As we probe further,
however, the analysis seems vulnerable. First, the Dombrowski con-
ception of the criminal defense was too atomistic. No weight was
given to the possibility of granting a motion to dismiss the criminal
indictment on the ground that the statute was invalid on its face. That
the overbreadth claim might be asserted as part of the criminal defense
was in fact recognized by the Court in subsequent years. 31
Second, the power of the federal injunctive remedy was exaggerated.
The irreparable injury requirement demanded a comparative perspec-
30. 380 U.S. at 486.
31. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plunmer v. City of
Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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tive and could be satisfied only by identifying defects in an alternative
noninjunctive remedy at law-in this instance the criminal defense-
that were not present with the injunction. Yet some of the defects
Dombrowski attributed to the criminal defense were also present with
the federal injunction. A criminal court might reject the motion to
dismiss on an overbreadth theory, but that contingency was also present
in an injunctive suit. A citizen could not initiate a criminal defense,
but the power of the plaintiff to initiate an injunctive suit was limited
by the imminency requirement. Similarly, the judgment rendered in
an injunctive proceeding might be no broader-no more effective to
curb chilling effect-than one granting a motion to dismiss. For
example, as the Dombrowski Court acknowledged in footnote 7, the
statute might be revived once it received an acceptable limiting con-
struction, and, so construed, might be applied to such conduct occur-
ring before its reinterpretation as had received "fair warning. '32
Speakers might be chilled by the mere risk that they would sub-
sequently be deemed to have received such warning.
Third, the narrowness of the lens inherited from Douglas v. City of
Jeannette forced Justice Brennan to limit artificially the scope of his
analysis. Even assuming the defense to a criminal prosecution was
sufficiently flawed to render it "inadequate," a determination of ir-
reparable injury should have included an evaluation of other alterna-
tive remedies at law. More importantly, if concerns of federalism
were paramount, federal injunctive relief should have been measured
against the entire universe of state remedies, legal or equitable. Thus
state injunctive or declaratory proceedings could have protected the
values implicit in an overbreadth claim as well as a federal injunc-
tion,3 3 yet the irreparable injury doctrine precluded such a broad
comparison.
A similar point could be made about the Justice's use of the bad-
faith harassment claim, the other sufficient ground for a finding of
irreparable injury. Since the harm lay in the fact of a bad-faith pros-
ecution rather than its outcome, a criminal defense was an inadequate
remedy. On the other hand, if the purview of the lens were widened
and remedies other than the criminal defense considered, some might
be found adequate. State declaratory judgments, state injunctions, or
32. 380 U.S. at 491 n.7.
33. In Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 526-29 (1932), for example, the Court held
that district courts arc without equity jurisdiction where the constitutionality of a state
tax law may be challenged in a suit at law in state court to recover taxes paid under
protest. The Court held that the availability of this procedure obviated the need for
a determination as to the adequacy of defense to a criminal action for nonpayment.
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state malicious prosecution actions, for example, might have been at
least as adequate as a federal injunction.
Dombrowski's treatment of the bad-faith harassment claim was also
vulnerable because the meaning of the claim remained unsettled. I
see four strands running through the discussion, but no exact defini-
tion: 34 first, a prosecution brought with no chance of success, either
because no evidence whatever exists against the defendant, or because
the statute is patently invalid; second, discriminatory enforcement or
the use of impermissible criteria for prosecution, such as a defendant's
race or political beliefs; third, vindictively repetitive prosecutions; and
fourth, intentionally aborted prosecutions, designed to deprive the
defendant of an opportunity to adjudicate the validity of the statute.3 5
Dombrowski did not relate these elements of bad-faith harassment
to one another or to possible state remedies. The more significant
fact is the enormous evidentiary difficulty faced by a litigant in prov-
ing any of these elements. The first crude form of bad-faith harassment
occurs relatively infrequently; the others present the imposing eviden-
tiary burden of demonstrating prosecutorial motive. As a practical
matter-and in contrast to the overbreadth claim-the universe of bad-
faith-harassment claims that can be established is virtually empty.36
34. "Bad-faith harassment" is Justice Brennan's phrase in his later opinion in Perez
v. Lcdesma, 401 U.S. 82, 97 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other
members of the Court treated the two elements conjunctively, "bad faith and harass-
ment," Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (emphasis added), or occasionally dis-
junctively, a "state proceeding ... motivated by a desire to harass or . . . conducted in
bad faith," Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). Since one cannot readily
imagine either good-faith harassment or bad-faith without harassment, the phrase is
tautological (but nevertheless useful to identify, or at least label, a certain species of
prosecutorial behavior).
35. See 380 U.S. at 490.
36. In the period after Domnbrowski but before Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
most lower courts were reluctant to find bad-faith harassment on the part of state of-
ficials. Maraist, supra note 26, at 585-87. On occasion, though, exceptions were made. See
Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Cantrell v.
Folsom, 332 F. Supp. 767 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La.
1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972) (involving Jim
Garrison's notorious pursuit of an alleged Kennedy assassin); Taylor v. City of Selma,
327 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (finding harassment of two of three plaintiffs). If
anything, exceptions became even less frequent under Younger's regime of "Our
Federalism." A review of the reported cases decided in the years after Younger reveals
only five instances in which bad-faith harassment was established in suits seeking to
enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions. See Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 707
(9th Cir. 1972); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 48-50 (S.D. Tex.
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nora. Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262
(1976); Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, 402 F. Supp. 1379, 1388-89 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp.
1010, 1013-14 (N.D. I1. 1973); cf. McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp. 1111, 1124-25, 1129
(E.D. Tex. 1972) (finding of bad-faith harassment, but no injunction of pending prosecu-
tion; declaratory relief granted and the city council enjoined from "rc-enacting such
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The great significance of Younger v. Harris37 is that it shrank Dom-
browski down to this empty universe.
II
Dombrowski was at peril from the very start. The intricacies of its
analysis could not hide its revolutionary promise. It appeared to open
doors that had long been kept shut by Douglas v. City of Jeannette.
Like a diagram with footprints and arrows, it showed the way around
all of the second-order obstacles to federal injunctive relief against
state prosecutions. "Chilling effect" and "overbreadth" became the
slogans of civil rights litigators.
Though steeped in the language of equitable remedies, Dombrowski
was of course not a struggle about remedies but about judges. Justice
Harlan, in dissent, complained of the majority's "unarticulated as-
sumption that state courts will not be as prone as federal courts to
vindicate constitutional rights promptly and effectively." 38 In truth,
this was not the majority's assumption, but the plaintiffs'. The majority
could only be faulted, if that is the proper word, for indulging it; the
majority was willing to respect the plaintiffs' judgment as to which
forum-state or federal-would be more likely effectively and fairly to
adjudicate their grievance against the state.
The Court's indulgence could have been predicated on a number
of premises: that access to federal courts should be presumed because
they were the primary guardians of constitutional rights; that the
state court judges of the South were partial and unwilling to protect
the civil rights movement; that a rule respecting a citizen's choice of
forum would, by and large, enhance the likelihood of the citizen's
success and that likelihood should be enhanced; or, more neutrally,
that there was no sensible way of second-guessing a citizen's choice of
forum. In order to second-guess a plaintiff's choice of forum, a federal
court would have had either to have presumed irrebuttably that the
state courts were fair or to have placed the state courts on trial. The
first alternative was at odds with the little we knew from experience,
ordinance"). For cases that have found allegations of bad faith sufficient to require an
evidentiary hearing, see Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1975); and
Reed v. Giarrusso, 462 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1972). In the one case where the Supreme
Court reviewed findings of bad-faith harassment, it reversed the lower court. Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1975); cf. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975)
(allegations of bad-faith harassment properly dismissed by the district court). For a
discussion of bad-faith harassment in the Littleton litigation, see pp. 1151-52 infra.
37. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
38. 380 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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and the second was almost unthinkable. It would have overburdened
the front end of each lawsuit and been self-defeating-the very in-
quiry itself would have been a massive affront to state officials.
The Dornbrowski opinion explicitly articulated and analyzed none
of these premises. Instead it adopted wholesale the conceptual ap-
paratus of Douglas v. City of Jeannette, and achieved its ends by
finessing the concept of irreparable injury. The result was that the
altered vision of federalism, the underlying premise of the case, re-
mained submerged, silent beneath the smooth manipulation of equity
doctrine. And if, as we have seen, that manipulation was vulnerable
on several counts, the underlying vision of federalism would remain
undefended.
This became crucially important as the Dombrowski majority began
to fall apart. There were, first, personnel changes. Thurgood Marshall
had replaced Clark. On the other hand, the Chief Justice had been
replaced by Warren Burger; and Goldberg's position had passed to
Fortas and then on to Blackmun. Even more importantly, the context
had altered. For one thing, the civil rights movement had matured:
it had lost its regional focus. If the rules were changed to benefit the
movement, the changes would have a national scope. Moreover, be-
ginning with Watts in the summer of 1965, black riots broke out in
many large cities of the nation. These traumatic events had little to
do with the civil rights protests and demonstrations that marked the
early 1960s; but they-like the assassinations of President Kennedy,
Senator Kennedy and Martin Luther King-no doubt affected the Jus-
tices' perception of those protest activities. The Justices were less in-
clined to intervene on behalf of the movement, less inclined to
guarantee it a federal forum. This disaffection was reinforced by the
change in the tactics and underlying grievances of radical politics. Pro-
tests were no longer confined to civil rights; the anti-war movement
and student radicalism moved to the center of the First Amendment
arena. The silent sit-in was overtaken by massive and often vitupera-
tive demonstrations, such as the march on the Pentagon, the demon-
stration at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, or the
student takeovers at Columbia and Cornell. It was no longer clear
that the silent premises that lay at the heart of Dombrowski could
carry the day.
The issue came to a head in 1971 in Younger v. Harris.39 The case
was carefully put together to take advantage of Dombrowski. The
diagram was followed to a letter. The plaintiffs in Younger presented
39. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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the quintessential overbreadth claim: they sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, a statute
seeming to reach the mildest speech and deriving from an earlier
era of Red Scares and attacks on the IWW\. The choice of plaintiffs
was also careful. One of them, Harris, had a prosecution already pend-
ing against him, and since that directly posed the issue of whether
§ 1983 was an exception to § 2283, counsel made sure a second group
of nonprosecuted plaintiffs, including radical political activists and a
teacher, joined in with a claim of chilling effect to cushion the
potential loss on the § 2283 issue.
But all this careful preparation was for nothing. Their case was
demolished, along with a goodly portion of Dombrowski. And while
that may have been expected given the changes in Court personnel
and social context, there were two remarkable features to Younger,
features that especially inform our inquiry into the limits of judicial
statesmanship. First, the apparatus created by Dombrowski was used
to close the door to federal injunctive relief. The squeeze play be-
tween imminency and irreparable injury, which lay dormant in Dom-
browski, was tightened and brought fully to bear. The activists and
teacher sought federal relief too soon; Harris, too late. Second, and
even more remarkably, Justice Brennan concurred in that result.
The opinion was written by Justice Black, who had not participated
in Dombrowski and who had joined Chief Justice Stone's opinion in
Douglas. He saw Dombrowski as the enemy. He countered with "Our
Federalism," a conception derived from the 1793 Anti-Injunction Act 4
(and blindly overlooking the Civil War, reconstruction, legislation
such as §§ 1331, 1343 and 1983,'41 and all such intervening events),
and from a "notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state func-
tions."'4 2 But Justice Black, no less than Justice Brennan, did not
analyze, rigorously or otherwise, the underlying tenets of federalism.
He merely gave us a new shibboleth, "Our Federalism," to express the
anti-nationalist sentiment that was to guide his interpretation of the
equitable doctrines that Dombrowski preserved from Douglas.
Armed with "Our Federalism," Justice Black first construed the im-
minency requirement to eliminate the nonprosecuted plaintiffs. The
attack was quick and unconvincing: "A federal lawsuit to stop a
prosecution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons having no
fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or specula-
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
41. id. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
42. 401 U.S. at 44.
1118
Vol. 86: 1103, 1977
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 1118 1976-1977
Dombrowski
tive are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in such cases." 4 3
No explanation was given why the fears of the activists and teacher
were merely "imaginary" or "speculative," especially given the historic
origins of the statute, its apparent reach, and the pendency of the
prosecution against Harris. No account was taken of what was then
established doctrine-that First Amendment rights were especially
"vulnerable" and "important," thus warranting the earliest judicial
intervention. No reason was given why an adjudication at the behest
of the teacher and activists would be flawed; surely there was sufficient
adverseness to ensure that the issues were fully litigated. And to say,
as Justice Black did, that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was a
''serious matter" hardly justified refusing to adjudicate the merits of
their claim altogether. If the requested relief was a "serious matter,"
so was the refusal to adjudicate that request.
In the second prong of his attack, Justice Black dealt with the
prosecuted plaintiff, Harris, and concluded that he could not demon-
strate irreparable injury. Black said that "the cost, anxiety, and in-
convenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution,
could not by themselves be considered 'irreparable.' ",4 In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Black fastened on a central ambiguity of the
irreparable injury requirement-its failure to specify how inadequate
alternative remedies must be before federal equitable relief would be
available. The imperatives of "Our Federalism" were interpreted to
require that "even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is 'both
great and immediate.' "4 "Our Federalism" thus both supplied the
raison d'etre of the irreparability requirement and simultaneously in-
flated its rigor. At the same time Justice Black dismantled the central
achievement of Dombrowski, the linkage of irreparable injury and
overbreadth.
Justice Black dealt with the overbreadth branch of Dombrowski by
essentially treating it as unpersuasive dictum.4 6 He denied that Dom-
browski used overbreadth to meet the irreparable injury requirement
and argued that in any event, overbreadth could not meet the irrepar-
able injury requirement as properly understood in the light of "Our
Federalism." He dismissed the supposed chilling effect on First
Amendment rights of overbroad statutes. He spoke of the impossibility
of guarding against the chilling effect of overbroad statutes, and thus
43. Id. at 42.
44. Id. at 46.
45. Id. (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
46. Id. at 50-53.
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neatly caught Justice Brennan in his own trap. Justice Black said that
since footnote 7 in Dom browski left open the possibility of retrospec-
tive validation of an overbroad statute, the chilling effect would
exist anyway, even with broad injunctive relief to the federal plaintiff.
Finally, he complained that the total invalidation of state statutes on
an overbreadth theory was inconsistent with traditional conceptions
of the adjudicatory process.
Having eliminated the overbreadth branch of Dombrowski, the
question remained whether the irreparable injury requirement-now
inflated by the requirements of "Our Federalism"-could ever be met.
Justice Black identified two possible situations: bad-faith harassment,
the only branch of Dombrowski allowed to survive; and statutes
" 'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibi-
tions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner
and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.' "47 Few
litigants could bring themselves within either of these categories. 4S
Harris was no exception, and access to federal injunctive relief was
denied.
Although there was a prosecution pending against Harris, Justice
Black's opinion-so strident and overreaching-did not focus on this
aspect of the case. The adequacy of the criminal defense as an al-
ternative remedy to the federal injunction was not tied in his analysis
to an actual pending prosecution. Yet there was reason to believe the
pendency of the prosecution was significant: Justice Black, in a
manner reminiscent of Chief Justice Stone in Douglas, used § 2283
as his policy oracle, and that statute is activated only when there are
proceedings in a state court. In a separate concurrence, Justices Harlan
and Stewart, whose votes were needed for the Younger majority, em-
47. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). The Dombrowski
conception of bad-faith harassment may have been spacious enough to include this
exception. See p. 1115 supra.
48. For a discussion of the narrowness of the bad-faith harassment exception, see
note 36 supra. The narrowness of the flagrantly and patently violative exception was
evidenced by Younger itself. Harris could not bring himself within the exception, and
yet the statute under which he was indicted had been effectively invalidated in Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969), as the Court itself acknowledged. 401 U.S. at
40-41. The limited nature of the exception is reconfirmed by the Court's latest pronounce-
ment in Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4538, 4539-44 (U.S. May 31, 1977), in
which four of the Justices complained of the Court's rigid treatment of the exception.
Justice Stevens complained that such treatment "actually eliminates one of the excep-
tions" under the Younger doctrine. Id. at 4542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Hernandez was
one of only three cases in which a district court had utilized the flagrantly and patently
violative exception. The others were Nihiser v. Sendak, 405 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind.
1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 976 (1975) (for reconsideration in light of Huff-
man v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)); and McGuire v. Roebuck, 347 F. Supp. 1111
(E.D. Tex 1972) (declaratory relief).
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phasized the fact that a prosecution was pending against Harris.49 This
created the possibility that, wholly apart from these exceptions, the
irreparable injury requirement might have been satisfied had no
prosecution been pending against Harris. It was thus possible to read
Younger to mean that the bar to access it created was vitally dependent
upon a pending prosecution.
It was just this possibility that provides the key to understanding
what otherwise seems inscrutable-Justice Brennan's concurrence in
Younger. He saw in this possible interpretation of Younger an op-
portunity to salvage as much of Dombrowski as he could. Justice Black
had tried to reduce Dombrowski to a virtual nullity, and Justice
Brennan countered by trying to reduce Younger. Justice Brennan's
strategy was to reduce Younger to a rule requiring that no prosecu-
tion be pending against the federal plaintiff, and to shift the focus
from injunctions to declaratory judgments. Once again, the Justice
chose not to meet the principles of "Our Federalism" head on, but to
blunt their implication by the deft manipulation of technical doctrine.
Justice Brennan chose his ground in Perez v. Ledesma,50 a com-
panion case to Younger in which the plaintiff, against whom there
was no prosecution pending, was seeking a declaratory judgment.
Evidently Justice Black feared that his Younger majority would dis-
solve over the question whether there should be access to a federal
court if there were no prosecution pending. He took pains to avoid the
issue in his majority opinion in Perez, holding that the question of the
constitutionality of a parish obscenity ordinance, as to which no
prosecution was pending, was not properly before the Court. Justice
Brennan, on the other hand, was determined to use Perez as a forum
for articulating and launching his post-Younger strategy.a1
Justice Brennan set up his Perez opinion by agreeing that neither
declaratory nor injunctive relief would be available if there were a
state prosecution pending against the federal plaintiff. His willingness
49. 401 U.S. at 54-55 (Stewart, J., concurring). Only Justices Burger and Blackmun
joined in justice Black's opinion without qualification; Justices White and Marshall
joined Justice Brennan's separate concurrence in thi result; Justice Douglas dissented.
50. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
51. Justice Black relied in part on Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967), which held
that a three-judge court cbuld not be properly convened to consider statutes of only
local application, such as a local ordinance. 401 U.S. at 86-87. Justice Brennan sur-
mounted Justice Black's technical obstacle by arguing that once a three-judge court is
properly convened to consider one controversy between two parties, it can consider all
issues between the parties, including challenges to local ordinances. Id. at 98-100
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan's desire to use
Perez as a forum is betrayed by his discussion of the merits. He acknowledged that even
the local prosecutor did not contest the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. Id. at 130.
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to abide by such a no-prosecution-pending rule in the injunctive con-
text was signaled by his concurrence in Younger. 2 His willingness to
abide by it in the declaratory context was signaled by his separate
concurrence in the result of another Younger companion, Samuels v.
Mackell,5S involving a challenge to the New York criminal anarchy
statute. The Younger majority held in Samuels that the declaratory
judgment was subject to the requirements of Younger and that "the
same equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction
must be taken into consideration by federal district courts in de-
termining whether to issue a declaratory judgment."a4 Justice Brennan
concurred only in the proposition that, in the absence of bad-faith
harassment, declaratory judgments should not issue in the face of a
pending prosecution. He referred to his Perez opinion for further
elaboration,55 an opinion that stands as a major essay on the dis-
tinction between federal declaratory judgments and injunctions. 0
This distinction did not seem relevant to the imminency require-
ment.ar The injunction consists of a declaration of rights and duties
backed by threat of sanction. It gives the defendant one more chance.
The declaratory judgment, on the other hand, gives the defendant
two more chances: it consists of a declaration of rights and duties, and
if the defendant disobeys the plaintiff cannot get a contempt order,
but only an injunction to prevent another act of disobedience. The
injunction, then, involves an additional element of coercion, an ad-
ditional threat of sanction for disobedience; but this difference does
not functionally relate to the issue of imminency, to the question of
when a court should intervene. In any event, after Younger im-
minency was given an Article III case-or-controversy rather than an
equity basis, and thus it would apply with equal rigor to declaratory
52. Strictly speaking, this is true only for that aspect of the case concerned with
Harris. The Justice could have taken a stand on the other plaintiffs, the activists and
the teacher, particularly given his sensitivity to the chilling effect of overbroad statutes.
But perhaps he wanted to save his capital for other ventures, or feared that he would
lose the votes of White and Marshall, who joined his Younger concurrence as well as
his opinions that day in Samuels and Perez.
53. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
54. Id. at 73.
55. Id. at 75-76 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
56. Perez was foreshadowed by Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967), where
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, made plain that "a federal district court has the
duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of the declaratory request irrespective
of its conclusion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunction."
57. There is muffled suggestion to the contrary in the Justice's opinion in Perez, 401
U.S. at 119 n.12. But that should be compared with his opinion in the second Zwichler
case, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), carefully preserved and noted in Perez. See
401 U.S. at 101-03.
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judgments and injunctions, or for that matter, to any remedy afforded
by a federal court.
The great benefit of the shift from injunctions to declaratory judg-
ments lay in its impact on the other obstacles to access identified in
Douglas and preserved in Dom browski-§ 2283 and irreparable injury.
On a literal or highly technical reading, § 2283 did not seem applicable
to declaratory judgments; indeed, in the mid-1960s civil rights liti-
gators started focusing on declaratory judgments to avoid the § 2283
bar. In his Perez opinion, the Justice declared that § 2283 was not
applicable to declaratory judgments. 58 Moreover, as a new statutory
creation, the declaratory judgment was not moored to the history of
equity. After an extended discussion of the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act of 1934, Justice Brennan dryly noted in Perez, "The
prerequisites for injunctive and declaratory relief are different." 9 In
contrast to the reasoning of the Samuels majority, Justice Brennan
argued that declaratory relief should not be subject to the equitable
requirement of irreparable injury, a requirement that Younger had
made so inhospitable.
This reasoning meant that Dombrowski could now be built on in a
practically important way. Aside from the trivial category of claims of
bad-faith harassment, access under Dombrowski was conditioned upon
the presentation of an overbreadth claim; it was the special structural
features of that claim that rendered the alternative remedy, the
criminal defense, inadequate. But once declaratory judgments were
freed from the traditional formulas of equity, declaratory relief could
issue whether or not the federal plaintiff faced irreparable injury or
inadequate alternative remedies at law. There was no need to find a
special feature of the plaintiff's claim that could not adequately be
accommodated by the criminal defense. There was no need to rely on
overbreadth. The claim need not even be based on the First Amend-
ment.
Justice Brennan, however, still needed to explain his concurrence in
the holding of Samuels, that if a prosecution were pending against the
federal plaintiff no declaratory relief would issue. The Samuels
majority had explained this holding in terms of the irreparable injury
requirement. Without that requirement, Justice Brennan had to
create a new formula to anchor his proposed no-prosecution-pending
bar. For that purpose he chose the concept of "comity." "Comity" was
to function for declaratory judgments in much the same way as
58. 401 U.S. at 128-29 n.18.
59. Id. at 123.
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"irreparable injury" was to function for injunctions-as the doctrinal
anchor for rules restricting access. Frankness was served by this linguis-
tic exchange. The masking of federalist values in the language of
equity, a tradition epitomized by Douglas v. City of Jeannette and
perpetuated in Dombrowski, could now be abandoned, at least in the
realm of declaratory judgments.
"Comity" is a spacious concept; it can serve whatever values are
infused into it. In Perez, Justice Brennan concluded that if a state
prosecution were pending, "the interests protected by federal interven-
tion must be weighed against the broad countervailing principles of
federalism."'60 However, if no prosecution were pending, Justice
Brennan made clear that for him a proper understanding of the
principles of comity began with "the congressional scheme that makes
the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional rights."'61
Operationally this meant that in the absence of a pending prosecution
the federal declaratory remedy became a presumptively available
remedy against an unconstitutional state statute: When no state
prosecution is pending "[o]rdinarily a declaratory judgment will be
appropriate if the case-or-controversy requirements of Article III are
met .... "62
Over time, such easy availability of declaratory judgments would
have an important bearing on the availability of injunctions. This is
because in many situations injunctions and declaratory judgments are
functionally equivalent. In such situations it would be hard-either on
a practical or theoretical level-to use doctrines like the irreparable
injury requirement to maintain two sets of rules, one more restrictive
than the other. 3 Thus Justice Brennan's strategy in Perez was deeply
laid, its implications so much more profound than its appearance. But
for the moment he was content nominally to preserve the distinction
between injunctions and declaratory judgments, theorizing that ir-
reparable injury, and not his loosened concept of comity, should re-
main a barrier to the issuance of a federal injunction. A bad-faith
harassment claim would be in itself sufficient to surmount it. Absent
a bad-faith harassment claim, it could be surmounted only if there
were no prosecution pending. If no prosecution were pending, it
could, at least according to Justice Brennan, be satisfied by a finding
of overbreadth.
60. Id. at 121.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Id. at 121.
63. See pp. 1144-48 infra.
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The crucial concession of Justice Brennan's Perez strategy was that
all federal anticipatory relief, injunctive or declaratory, would be
barred if there were a prosecution pending. It was a retreat from
Dombrowski. At the time the Supreme Court directed the issuance
of the injunction in Dombrowski, there was a prosecution pending
in the state courts. That there was no prosecution pending at the
time that the federal suit had been filed was of questionable signifi-
cance, since in Perez Justice Brennan treated the time of hearing, not
of filing, as the critical point for applying the no-prosecution-pending
rule. 4 There was a state prosecution pending against the plaintiff
in Perez at the time he filed his suit, but by the time the suit was
heard in federal district court the state prosecution had been nolled.
Wholly apart from the question whether the no-prosecution-pending
bar represented a revision of Dombrowshi, it seems clear that it is
without adequate theoretical foundation. Justice Brennan's analysis
of the appropriate "countervailing principles of federalism" was weak
and half-hearted. His first claim was that the pending state prosecu-
tion would provide a concrete opportunity for the defendant to
vindicate his constitutional claims.65 The problem with this justifica-
tion is, of course, that it ignored the defects in the criminal defense
that Justice Brennan himself had noted earlier in connection with
Dombrowski.0 0 The pendency of the prosecution may eliminate one
shortcoming of the criminal defense, the absence of power in the
citizen to initiate it, but curing one defect does not eliminate the
others.
As a second line of argument, Justice Brennan suggested that when
a prosecution is pending, affirmative federal relief would not ac-
celerate the determination of constitutional rights. Resort to a federal
court, he said, would "not speed up the resolution of the controversy
since that will not come to an end in any event until the state litiga-
tion is concluded."0 1' This argument is also unpersuasive. The very
purpose of the federal affirmative relief-declaratory or injunctive-
is to stop the state prosecution. The citizen claims that the state statute
is invalid, and if his claim is upheld, it would be unthinkable to allow
the state prosecution to wend its way to conclusion.
Finally, Justice Brennan invoked a concern for preserving the in-
64. 401 U.S. at 109. Justice Brennan explicitly reserved the question whether fed-
eral relief would be proper if a state prosecution were begun after the filing of the
federal suit but before the federal hearing. Id. at 117 n.9. See p. 1134 & note 98 inlra.
65. Id. at 121.
66. See pp. 1112-14 supra.
67. 401 U.S. at 121.
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tegrity of state processes. He stated that "federal intervention may
disrupt the state proceeding through the issuance of necessary stays,"
and noted that when a state prosecution is pending, federal considera-
tion of claims for affirmative relief create the possibility of "unwar-
ranted and unseemly duplication of the State's own adjudicative
process."' 8 It is here that the Justice struck the most responsive chord,
and yet the argument fails for its incompleteness and its inconsistency
with the other tenets of his nationalism. The concern with "unseemly
duplication" does not express a considered judgment about federal
structure, but rather a conclusion to which the Justice was, in my
judgment, driven by the necessities of judicial politics.
This concern with the integrity of state processes is consistent with
the Justice's reluctance to have federal courts oversee evidentiary
rulings in ongoing state processes-a reluctance he carefully expressed
in Dombrowski. 9 But in Perez he used this concern with the integrity
of state processes to bar federal adjudication of the constitutionality of
the underlying state criminal statute, and that seems at odds with the
nationalism of Dombrowski. The Justice did not distinguish the "un-
seemly duplication" that he spoke of in Perez from the duplication
that necessarily occurs whenever the Supreme Court reverses a state
criminal conviction, as in Murdock itself, or whenever a federal court
grants a writ of habeas corpus after conviction, as in Fay v. Noia,T"
another Brennan achievement. Moreover, such delicate concern for
the integrity of state processes is evidently incompatible with Justice
Brennan's defense of the bad-faith harassment exception to the no-
prosecution-pending bar. Although Justice Brennan asserted that
federal intervention to prevent bad-faith harassment would not inter-
fere with good-faith law enforcement,-' this presupposes the validity
of the claim. Access must depend on the nature of the claim, not the
outcome of a trial. While adjudicating the merits of a bad-faith harass-
ment claim, federal courts would have to interfere with state proceed-
ings by enjoining prosecutions.
68. Id.
69. In footnote 3 of Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 485 n.3, the Justice announced: "It is
difficult to think of a case in which an accused could properly bring a state prosecution
to a halt while a federal court decides his claim that certain evidence is rendered in-
admissible by the Fourteenth Amendment."
70. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
71. 401 U.S. at 120. Justice Brennan also asserted that adjudication of bad-faith
harassment claims did not necessarily require a decision on the constitutionality of a
statute. Id. Of course, if the claim were that a prosecution had been brought with no
chance of success because the statute in question was patently invalid, arguably em-
braced within Justice Brennan's conception of bad-faith harassment, see p. 1115 supra,
constitutional adjudication of the statute's validity would be required.
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Even more fundamentally, Justice Brennan's adoption of a no-
prosecution-pending bar is irreconcilable with his position that federal
anticipatory relief should be available in the absence of a pending
prosecution. Justice Brennan sought to justify federal intervention in
such circumstances on the grounds that "individuals should be able to
exercise their constitutional rights without running the risk of becom-
ing lawbreakers." 2 The trouble with this justification is that it was
merely an argument for anticipatory relief, not for federal relief. After
all, state declaratory or injunctive relief could equally well serve this
function. The necessity for federal judicial intervention could be
established only with an additional premise: that once called upon by
the citizen, it was the responsibility of federal courts to protect con-
stitutional rights by determining the constitutionality of state statutes.
And this premise-encapsulated in his phrase "the federal courts [are]
the primary guardians of constitutional rights"73-is deeply at odds
with Justice Brennan's concession that federal relief should not be
available if state prosecutions were pending. Even if the "principles
of comity" required a healthy respect for state proceedings, the ultimate
question had to be the power to determine the constitutionality of
state laws. Once that power was clearly recognized to lie in federal
courts, respect for the states would seem irrelevant to whether it was
exercised before, during, or after a state prosecution. The disruption
and duplication occasioned by federal affirmative relief in the context
of a pending prosecution should not be viewed as "unseemly," but
rather as the necessary and appropriate consequence of the role of the
federal courts as "the primary guardians of constitutional rights."T4
Although the no-prosecution-pending bar was not intellectually com-
pelling, it was a concession made in a serious attempt to forge a new
Court position. The intent was to salvage as much of Dombrowski as
possible in the face of a generally hostile majority. Justice Brennan's
Perez opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and White, and it was
composed with an eye toward Justices Stewart and Harlan's concur-
rence in Younger, which pointedly noted that "the Court today does
not resolve the problems involved when a federal court is asked to
give injunctive or declaratory relief from future state criminal prosecu-
tions." 7  And, of course, Justice Brennan knew he could always count
on Justice Douglas-Douglas alone had dissented in Younger, declaring
72. 401 U.S. at 120.
73. Id. at 104.
74. See pp. 1131-32 infra.
75. 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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that even if a prosecution were pending access to federal equity court
should remain. In fact Justice Douglas had refused to concur in
Justice Brennan's Perez opinion, possibly because he considered it an
unwarranted retreat from Dombrowski.
The Court took a first step toward vindicating Justice Brennan's
Perez strategy the very next Term. After seven years of strenuously
avoiding the question, the Court in Mitchum v. Foster76 finally ruled
that § 1983 was an exception to § 2283. The irony of the case is strik-
ing. In Younger Justice Black focused exclusively on § 2283 as a policy
oracle, ignoring whatever message § 1983 had to transmit; in Mitchum
Justice Stewart not only rediscovered § 1983, but found that it made
§ 2283 inoperative. Indeed, Justice Stewart pointed to historical
research suggesting that § 2283 was predicated more on hostility toward
injunctions as a remedy than on any vision of federal structure.
77
By the time of the Mitchum decision, § 2283 had in fact lost most of
its significance as a technical obstacle to federal affirmative relief. Even
in the absence of the statute, Younger and Samuels effectively barred
anticipatory remedies if a state prosecution was pending. There were
no longer grounds for the fear that had previously restrained the
Court, that a § 1983 exception to § 2283 would eat up the statute. The
practical benefit of Mitchum was that if a prosecution were pending,
an injunction requested because of bad-faith harassment could be is-
sued; it would not be barred by the statute. And, although evidentiary
problems render this universe near-empty, the very existence of the
bad-faith exemption suggests the possibility of other exemptions, and
further revisions. Even Justice Black in Younger had reserved judg-
ment on whether "[o]ther unusual situations calling for federal inter-
vention might also arise."78 Doctrine has a malleability not present in
statutes.
Mitchum eliminated the § 2283 bar for injunctions. Another facet
of the Perez strategy-the rule that access for declaratory judgments
would "ordinarily" exist if no prosecution were pending-still needed
majority status. That seemed almost inevitable given the alignments
in Younger and Perez, but the law awaited a formal declaration. That
first occurred, of all places, in Roe v. Wade. 9
The plaintiff in Roe had brought a federal anticipatory suit against
a state criminal statute prohibiting abortions. The Court issued a
76. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
77. Id. at 232-33 n.10.
78. 401 U.S. at 54.
79. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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declaratory judgment, but declined to overturn the district court's
denial of an injunction. Of special significance was the fact that the
Court vindicated a substantive due process claim, not a First Amend-
ment or an overbreadth claim, thereby establishing that, as Justice
Brennan had suggested in footnote 10 of his Perez opinion,"" neither
was a prerequisite to federal declaratory relief. However, Roe was not
fully determinative, since the striking quality of the substantive issue
obscured and conceivably limited the availability of access; perhaps
the case was as sui generis on the access issue as it was on the merits.
The full triumph of Justice Brennan's strategy was therefore delayed
until 1974. Fittingly, it was Justice Brennan himself who wrote for
the Court in Steffel v. Thompson,81 vindicating his position that a
declaratory judgment might be issued so long as no prosecution was
pending, regardless of the appropriateness of injunctive relief. And
although Steffel involved a First Amendment challenge, it granted
relief upon a claim that a statute was invalid as applied, the antithesis
of the typical overbreadth claim.
III
Justice Brennan's Perez strategy kept Younger and "Our Federal-
ism" at bay. Much of Dombrowski was salvaged. But the Brennan
formulation of the no-prosecution-pending rule and his shift of focus
to declaratory relief were both primarily tactical maneuvers. The vi-
sion of federalism that underlay Dombrowski remained unarticulated,
vulnerable to doctrinal retrenchment. The new Court of the 1970s
owed it no allegiance.
At the time of Younger the nation was just beginning to emerge
from the radicalism of the 1960s. As we moved deeper into the 1970s
memories of the trauma persisted, and as a memory, the dislocation
became more prominent than the justice of the underlying grievances.
Even more, the conservative bloc had grown. By the time of Younger,
Nixon had already placed Burger and Blackmun in position; indeed
they were the only ones who unqualifiedly joined Justice Black's high-
pitched Younger opinion. In time Nixon replaced Justice Black with
Powell, and then appointed Rehnquist to fill Justice Harlan's vacancy.
By the mid-1970s the bloc that fully subscribed to Younger had grown
by one, and of even greater significance was the fact that in Justice
Rehnquist the Right had obtained a youthful, vigorous, and in-
80. 401 U.S. at 117 n.10.
81. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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deed clever spokesman. The Nixon bloc was one vote short of a
majority, but the middle of the Court-Justices Stewart and White-
was accessible. They had voted for Dombrowski, indeed they had
joined Justice Brennan's opinion, and yet I suspect that those were
reluctant votes, more dependent on concession and context than on
any strong vision of the proper allocation of judicial power in a fed-
eral structure. With the vote of either Stewart or White the Burger
Court could pass from the transitional phase of 1971 and begin its
program of retrenchment-leaving Dombrowski on the books, but
returning to the regime of Douglas v. City of Jeannette. At that point
Justice Brennan would move from spokesman of the Court to dissent.
A. The No-Prosecution-Pending Bar
Justice Brennan attempted to rescue Dombrowski by agreeing to
the no-prosecution-pending bar in Perez. That occurred in 1971. Iron-
ically, in the mid-1970s that bar became a doctrinal vehicle for retrench-
ment. Its potential for such use derived from its ambiguities: (1) Who
must the proceeding be against? (the identity issue); (2) When must the
proceeding be pending? (the temporal issue); and (3) What kind of
proceedings are covered? (the type-of-proceeding issue). The drift of
the decisions is unclear with respect to the first of these interstitial
issues, but there can be no doubt that the others were seized as entry
points for a further assault on Dombrowski.
1. The Identity Issue: Personalization
The suit for affirmative relief has been primarily conceptualized as
benefiting only a single plaintiff. Suppose, however, we broaden our
perspective and consider the situation in which many people are ad-
versely affected by the existence or enforcement of an allegedly in-
constitutional statute. A is not being prosecuted, B is. The no-prosecu-
tion-pending bar prevents B from obtaining federal affirmative relief.
But is B's disability only personal to him? That raises what I shall call
the identity issue: against whom must the prosecution be pending if
the Younger bar is to apply?
This issue first arose in the abortion cases. A prosecution under the
Texas abortion law was pending against a plaintiff-intervenor in Roe
v. Wade, Dr. Hallford. Hallford advanced an ingenious argument
whereby, for Younger purposes, his status as a "potential future de-
fendant" would entitle him to federal relief, notwithstanding his status
as a current state defendant. Justice Blackmun rejected this contention
out of hand and, on Younger grounds, denied Hallford permission to
1130
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intervene. 2 The more striking point, however, is that Justice Black-
mun went on to consider the merits. In other words he treated the
no-prosecution-pending bar as a personal defect; the prosecution pend-
ing against Hallford would not preclude federal anticipatory relief at
the behest of another plaintiff as to the very same statute.
For the Court to have held that the existence of a single prosecution
disabled all other potential plaintiffs for anticipatory relief in the
state would have been remarkable. At the same time, personalization
of the no-prosecution-pending requirement seems at odds with "Our
Federalism." The critical fact in Roe v. Wade was that once the state
statute was declared unconstitutional the pending prosecution against
Hallford would for all practical purposes be stopped, and this would
violate the principles of comity Younger sought to advance. Hallford
could probably count on the district attorney "voluntarily" dropping
the prosecution, for ultimately the defendant would have to be re-
leased. But even if the district attorney persisted, the operative assump-
tion, at the time of Roe and thereafter, was that Hallford would either
be entitled to the collateral estoppel effect of the judgment in Roe's
case (for the state was fully represented) or conceivably to injunctive
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202.s3
This inconsistency between the personalization of the no-prosecu-
tion-pending bar and "Our Federalism" did not go unnoticed. In 1974
in Sleffel v. Thompson1,s4 a counterattack was launched by Justice
Rehnquist seeking to recover this concession to Dombrowski. Steffel
raised the identity issue in a most dramatic form. The plaintiff and a
companion had distributed anti-war leaflets at a shopping center until
the manager called the police, who threatened the two with arrest
unless they ceased their handbilling. Plaintiff left to avoid arrest; his
companion persisted, was arrested, and was subsequently charged with
violating the Georgia criminal trespass statute. Plaintiff, claiming that
the threat of arrest under the statute thwarted his continuing desire to
distribute handbills at the shopping center, sought a federal declara-
tory judgment that the statute, as applied, was an unconstitutional
inhibition of his First Amendment rights.s8 Justice Brennan cited the
pending prosecution against his companion (the trial of which had
82. 410 U.S. at 126-27.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970): "Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory
judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any
adierse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment." See Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477-78 (1974) (White, J., concurring); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERtAL PR.ACTICE AND PROCLDURr § 2771 (1973).
84. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
85. Id. at 454-56.
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been stayed pending the decision in Steffel) as evidence that the plain-
tiff had satisfied the Article III case-or-controversy requirement (into
which the imminency requirement had been transformed), and pro-
ceeded to find that, because there was no prosecution pending against
him, there was no Younger bar to plaintiff's suit.8
Fully aware of the threat posed to "Our Federalism," Justice
Rehnquist sought to minimize the effects of such personalization. He
wrote separately in an attempt, no doubt a desperate one, to under-
mine the traditional view of the preclusive effect of a declaratory
judgment: "A declaratory judgment is simply a statement of rights, not
a binding order supplemented by continuing sanctions. State authori-
ties may choose to be guided by the judgment of a lower federal court,
but they are not compelled to follow the decision by threat of con-
tempt or other penalties. ' 67 The federal declaratory judgment may
be raised in subsequent state prosecutions "for whatever value it may
prove to have" 8 -like a law review article, maybe? Justice Rehnquist's
views provoked Justice White, who also concurred specially just to
disagree with Justice Rehnquist. (The majority did not think Justice
Rehnquist's views worthy of a response; only Chief Justice Burger
subscribed to them.) Justice White pointed out that Justice Rehn-
quist's notion of a declaratory judgment contradicted the express
terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act,8 9 and, he might have added,
sounded like an impermissible advisory opinion. Justice Rehnquist
advanced no theory that would give the judgment of the Ste fel
decision binding effect for one individual, and only one individual.
Justice White, it appears in retrospect, had his own preferred
method of undercutting the personalization of the no-prosecution-
pending bar. In Hicks v. Miranda,90 Justice White, fully aware of the
tension between such personalization and "Our Federalism," held for
the Court that a theater owner could not seek federal anticipatory re-
lief challenging the constitutionality of a statute under which two of
86. Id. at 458-59, 471-73.
87. Id. at 482. For an example of a similar limitation of the impact of a successful
anticipatory suit, see Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927). Cline was an appeal
from a decree enjoining the enforcement of a' state criminal antinust law. '1"he Cotn
vacated the injunction with respect to those plaintiffs against whomn prosecution, ui e
pending, but upheld it with respect to those against whon prosecutions isere onl%
threatened. The distinction was not rationalized on grounds of federalistm. hoise~er. but
was explained by the maxim that equity woull not enjoin pending criminal proceedings.
Id. at .153.
88. 415 U.S. at 482 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 477 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970): "Any such declaration shall hae the
force and effect of a final judgiiient or decree.
90. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
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his employees were presently being prosecuted. No prosecution was
pending against the theater owner; yet the Yo unger bar was deemed
applicable on the theory that his interests and those of the state de-
fendants "were intertwined."9 '
Justice White also turned the personalization theory to the ad-
vantage of "Our Federalism" in the context of a class action. The
question was whether a federal plaintiff against whom a prosecu-
tion was pending would be disabled from suing as the representative
of a class, some or most members of which had no prosecutions pend-
ing against them. Justice Blackmun had carefully left that question
open in footnote 7 of Roe v. Wade,9" but in O'Shea v. Littleton"
Justice White answered it, holding that a named plaintiff cannot serve
even in a representative capacity if a prosecution is pending against
him. The named plaintiff must himself satisfy the no-prosecution-
pending bar. Littleton also held that the named representative must
personally have standing under Article III, by demonstrating that he
is in imminent danger of being prosecuted.94 Thus the harshness of
the squeeze play created by the juxtaposition of the Article III-
imminency requirement and the no-prosecution-pending bar could
not be avoided by the representative form of a lawsuit.05
91. Id. at 348-49 (alternative holding).
92. 410 U.S. 113, 127 n.7 (1973).
93. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
94. The Litilelon case was not a declaratory suit aimed at a statute, such as Roe v.
Wade, but rather a request for an injunction that would effectively have required court
supervision of the administration of justice in Cairo, Illinois. I will later discuss the
special difficulties posed by such an injunction to the values of "Our Federalism," see
pp. 1148-60 infra, and yet it is hard to see why the difference in remedies should re-
quire different qualifications for serving as a representative of a class. More recently,
in Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535 (U.S. May 31, 1977), Justice White applied
the Littleton theory to bar a challenge against a statute. He wrote: "Appellees have
argued here that the relief granted in favor of other class members is not barred by
Younger and Huffman because state cases were not pending against some of them.
Since the class should never have been certified, we need not address this argument."
Id. at 4538 u.ll.
95. Relief from this bind may be available when there is an antecedent or real-world
nexus between the plaintiff and the persons purportedly represented, such as between
a union and its members. Alice v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), decided shortly after
Litileton, suggested as much. In Allee the Farm Workers Union and some of its members
sought injunctive relief against harassment of their organizing activities by the Texas
Rangers and declaratory relief against several Texas statutes. Justice Douglas suggested
that even if prosecutions were pending against individual union members, the union,
against which no prosecution was pending, might itself be entitled to maintain the
federal anticipatory action on behalf of all its members, including those against whom
prosecutions were pending. Id. at 814. Chief Justice Burger, in a separate opinion joined
by Justices white and Rehnquist, strenuously resisted this suggestion. Id. at 830-31. It
is of some interest that Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, joined the
majority in Alice and wrote separately in Littleton. Justice Powell did not participate in
AlIlee.
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2. The Temporal Issue: The Reverse Removal Power
On the identity issue the Court's position has not significantly de-
teriorated from that staked out by Justice Brennan in Steffel. It has
been circumscribed but not withdrawn. On the temporal issue, how-
ever, the Burger Court has taken a decisive step against the vision
of federalism underlying Dombrowski. The issue was addressed in a
second part of Hicks v. Miranda. In an opinion by Justice White the
Court resolved the temporal issue in the most draconian fashion-so
much so that Justice Stewart, along with Justices Marshall, Brennan
and Douglas, dissented and bitterly complained: "The doctrine of
Younger v. Harris reflects an accommodation of competing interests.
The rule announced today distorts that balance beyond recognition."',
The temporal issue is conceptually simple. It asks when a prosecu-
tion must be pending in order to serve as a Younger bar. In Perez
there was no prosecution pending at the time of the federal hearing
(although there was a prosecution pending at the time the federal
anticipatory suit was filed). The bar was inapplicable. But what if
there was a prosecution pending at the time of the federal hearing but
not when the federal suit was filed? Dombrowski would suggest the
no-prosecution-pending bar is also inapplicable; in Dombrowski an
injunction had issued although there was a state prosecution pending
at the time of the federal hearing, at the time the Supreme Court
declared the state statute invalid. Presumably this was predicated on
the view that there was no prosecution pending at the time the federal
suit had been filed.97 That would seem to have resolved the remaining
temporal issue, making the bar inapplicable if no prosecution was
pending at the time of filing, and yet Justice Brennan beat a puzzling
retreat in Perez. In footnote 9 he formally reserved the question and
thereby reopened it.9s Why?
In retrospect it appears that Justice Brennan made the concession
to obtain Justice White's vote (the only other Justice joining his
Perez opinion was Justice Marshall) and thus to create a broad
spectrum of support for his Perez opinion. Four years later in Hicks
v. Miranda, Justice White, overlooking the fact that he had joined
Dombrowski, seized footnote 9 of Perez and declared the question
96. 422 U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
97. Although strictly speaking Dombrowski only defined a pending prosecution for
the purposes of § 2283, this seems only a formal distinction.
98. 401 U.S. at 117 n.9: "I put to one side the question not presented in Ex parte
Young, or in this case, whether federal court relief would be proper when a state
prosecution pending at the time of the federal hearing was begun after the federal suit
was filed."
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"open"-or, as he put it, "At least some Justices have thought so."'9
He then continued: "[,VJe now hold that where state criminal pro-
ceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal com-
plaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits
have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v.
Harris should apply in full force."10 °
From the perspective of Younger, "Our Federalism," and the in-
terests they seek to further, the rule of Hicks v. Miranda makes sense.
As I pointed out in my criticism of Dombrowski's chronological treat-
ment of § 2283,101 if a state proceeding is in fact pending at the time
federal relief is issued, the effect of the relief on a state would be
virtually the same regardless of whether the state prosecution or the
federal suit was filed first, regardless of who had won the race to the
courthouse. As a practical matter, however, Hicks was a devastating
blow to Dombrowski.
As noted, latent in Dombrowski was a squeeze-play: the juxtaposi-
tion of imminency and a chronologically construed § 2283 required
the litigant to find a moment for filing the suit that was neither too
early nor too late. Steffel preserved this predicament, though it now
arose from the conjunction of an Article III-based imminency require-
ment and the no-prosecution-pending bar. "Preserved" may be too
soft a word to describe the contribution of Younger, given the stringent
interpretation of the imminency requirement, the virtual insistence
upon an actual threat of prosecution. ' - But however severe the
predicament might have been after Younger, Hicks took it one step
further: there was no point in even playing the game. There was no
way the litigant could win. The rule of Hicks meant that even if the
litigant found that magic moment for filing his suit-the moment that
was neither too early nor too late-the state was given the power to
deny access to the federal court by simply initiating a criminal prose-
cution in state court.
By pursuing the logic of "Our Federalism" to utter extreme, Hicks
fundamentally altered the structure of the federal jurisdictional
scheme: it vested the district attorney-not the aggrieved citizen-with
the power to choose the forum, and, indeed, the nature of the proceed-
ing in which the federal constitutional claim would be litigated. In es-
sence, Hicks created-in such stark contrast to the post-Civil War
99. 422 U.S. at 349 & n.17.
100. Id. at 349.
101. See p. 1109 supra.
102. See Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1215-16 & n.9 (1977); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 497-98 (1974). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1975).
1135
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 1135 1976-1977
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1103, 1977
removal statutes' 03-a reverse removal power: a power to remove a case
from the federal court to the state court. After a federal anticipatory
suit is filed, the district attorney can initiate a criminal prosecution
against the aggrieved citizen and by that action abort the federal suit
and remit the citizen to adjudicating his claim as a defense in a
criminal prosecution in the state court.' 04
3. The Type-of-Proceeding Issue: From Criminal to Civil
The spirit of "Our Federalism" also motivated the Burger Court's
treatment of the third of the interstitial questions-what kind of state
proceedings would trigger the Younger bar? The question is whether
Younger was keyed to a pending prosecution or a pending proceeding.
The state proceeding in Younger was a criminal one; in their separate
opinion Justices Stewart and Harlan emphasized this fact, stating that
the outcome might have been different if the state proceeding were
civil. 10 5 For the next four years no majority formed on the issue. This
period of indecision produced an exemption from the Younger bar
for inherently biased proceedings, such as one in which challenges
to a state licensing scheme are heard by a state board consisting of
those already licensed.10 Then in 1975, the Court-the Nixon four
103. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
104. The Court also made it clear that this power could not easily be circumscribed
by impugning the motives of the district attorney; it is a preemptory power. The
district court had in part based its finding of bad-faith harassment on the fact that the
state seemed to have filed the criminal proceeding in response to the filing of the fed-
eral affirmative suit. And yet the Court dismissed the finding of bad-faith harassment as
"vague and conclusory." 422 U.S. at 350-51 & n.19.
105. 401 U.S. at 54-55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
106. Gibson v. Berrylhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
In his dissent in Trainor v. Hernandez, 45 U.S.L.W. 4535, 4542-44 (U.S. May 31, 1977),
Justice Stevens built on the Gibson theory in a way that threatened the Younger no-
prosecution-pending bar itself.
At issue in Hernandez was the Illinois Attachment Act which plaintiffs claimed was
constitutionally infirm due to its failure to provide adequate notice and hearing before
assets were attached. As one might expect, the federal suit was commenced after the
attachment proceeding, and the defendant insisted that federal court access was barred
by the pendency of the latter proceeding. Justice Stevens thought the Younger bar
inapplicable, however, because the Illinois attachment proceeding "does not afford a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy for [the] federal claim." Id. at 4544. He cited Gibson
for this standard. Id. at 4544 n.15.
The very purpose of the Younger bar is to prevent a federal court inquiry into the
adequacy of the state proceeding, and that purpose would be defeated if the state
proceeding that triggers the Younger bar were itself to be tested by the standard Jus-
tice Stevens proposed. The Hernandez majority responded to Justice Stevens's point;
they agreed to remand to the district court, but only on the question whether the
plaintiffs could present their federal claim in the state attachment proceeding. Id. at
4538 & n.10. It is of some note, however, that Justice Stewart joined the Stevens dis-
sent, as well as the Brennan-Marshall dissent (which focused on the civil character
of the pending proceeding and on one other exception to the Younger bar, the patent
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plus Justices White and Stewart-spoke in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.'0
In Huffman, an Ohio prosecutor invoked that state's public nui-
sance statute and obtained a judgment in the county Court of Com-
mon Pleas closing a theater that specialized in allegedly pornographic
movies. Rather than appeal the judgment within the Ohio court
system, the theater management sought and obtained injunctive and
declaratory relief in federal district court under § 1983 on the grounds
that the nuisance statute was overbroad and amounted to impermis-
sible prior restraint. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state
raised the Younger doctrine as a bar to federal relief.los
Justice Rehnquist, for a majority of six, held that the Younger
bar was applicable, at least for the kind of state proceeding "which
in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than
are most civil cases.""'19 He emphasized two features of the state
court proceeding: "The State is a party to the Court of Common
Pleas proceeding, and the proceeding is both in aid of and closely re-
lated to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene
materials."" 0
With these features in mind, the result in Huffman is as explicable
in terms of "Our Federalism" as that in Hicks: there is no necessary
connection between a state's interest and the remedy it chooses to
effectuate the interest. It is hard to see why respect for state functions
is any less derogated by interrupting a civil proceeding to enforce
state law than it is by halting a criminal proceeding. Federal habeas
corpus would not be available if the state proceeding were civil, but
this was viewed-perhaps with good reason given the Younger prem-
ises-as a minor deficiency. Justice Rehnquist countered that even
assuming that a litigant who presents a federal claim is entitled to
a decision on the merits by a federal court (a premise that Justice
Rehnquist obviously doubted), Supreme Court review of the com-
pleted state court appellate process could be sought; "[wje do not
understand," he said, "why the federal forum must be available prior
invalidity of the state statute). Thus it might be said that Justice Stevens managed
to bring the Court within one vote of a return to the regime of the irreparable injury
requirement pure-unencumbered by the no-prosecution-pending bar-though cast in
the terms "plain, speedy and efficient."
107. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
108. The Younger issue was raised below, Brief for Appellants app. N at 3-7, Huff-
man v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), but was not ruled on by the district court. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, treated the Younger claim as having a priority, al-
most like a jurisdictional defect. 420 U.S. at 599. Yet in another case, Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 396-97 & n.3 (1975), the Court permitted the parties to waive the Younger
claim, and thereby suggested that the claim did not have jurisdictional status.
109. 420 U.S. at 604.
110. Id.
1137
HeinOnline -- 86 Yale L.J. 1137 1976-1977
The Yale Law Journal
to completion of the state proceedings in which the federal issue
arises . . .-. "
It would be a mistake, however, to view Huffman in a limited
fashion-as a carefully tailored resolution of an issue specifically re-
served by the initial Stewart-Harlan concurrence in Younger. Justice
Rehnquist himself subsequently used the precedent in a way that
ignored the special characteristics of the state civil proceeding in
Huffman. In Juidice v. Vail" 2 he applied Younger principles to a
state's contempt process, whether "labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or
criminal," 1 3 even though the state was not a party to the proceeding,
and even though a state's interest in the contempt process "is not
quite as important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its
criminal laws, . . . or even its interest in the maintenance of a quasi-
criminal proceeding such as was involved in Huffinan ...., The
three-judge district court in Vail had taken seriously Justice Rehn-
quist's emphasis that Younger principles applied only to state pro-
ceedings in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes and on that
ground found the Younger bar inapplicable. Justice Rehnquist com-
mented, "This was not an implausible reading of our holdings."a 15
In a later footnote, Justice Rehnquist reserved the question of whether
the Younger bar would apply to "all civil litigation," a 6 a reservation
Justice Brennan characterized as "toiigue-in-cheek. ' 1""
Vail, decided in March 1977, made clear that the presence of the
state is not a necessary condition for triggering the Younger bar. Two
months later, the Court took the logic of "Our Federalism" mani-
fested in Huffman one step further; it made the presence of the state
a sufficient condition. In Trainor v. Hernandez,lls the Court held
the Younger bar applicable to any proceeding, civil or criminal,
brought by the state. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice
'White, did not state the rule so broadly; it emphasized that the pro-
ceeding in question-an attachment proceeding to recover welfare
payments alleged to have been fraudulently procured-was "brought
by the State in its sovereign capacity."' l But the concept "sov-
ereign capacity," as distensible as it is inscrutable, is likely to provide
no limitation in fact.
111. Id. at 606.
112. 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977).
113. Id. at 1217.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1216.
116. Id. at 1218 n.13.
117. Id. at 1222 n.*
118. 45 U.S.L.-W. 4535 (U.S. May 31, 1977).
119. Id. at 4537.
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4. A New Requirement: Exhaustion of State Remedies
The full implications of Huffman can perhaps best be understood
when the case is seen not simply as a basis for expanding the reach
of the no-prosecution-pending bar, but as a vehicle for the intro-
duction into the Younger line of a new requirement altogether, the
exhaustion of state appellate remedies. Huffman's exhaustion require-
ment works a fundamental revision of the federal jurisdictional
scheme for affirmative suits. It is as architectonic as the reverse re-
moval power of Hicks and the no-prosecution-pending bar itself.
The exhaustion issue arose in Huffman because, on one view,
there were no longer any state proceedings pending against the federal
plaintiff. The Court of Common Pleas had rendered judgment before
the federal proceeding was commenced. The plaintiff had lost. The
Supreme Court nevertheless held that the citizen was not free to
commence a federal affirmative suit until he had completed all levels
of state appellate review. If the Court had stopped at this point,
Huffman might have been understood as simply addressing an issue
of duration-for what period is a state prosecution pending? Answer:
Until the state appellate procedures are completed. But the Court
did not stop at that point; it subtly substituted the word "unless"
for "until" and thus did not simply resolve an ambiguity implicit
in the no-prosecution-pending bar, but rather created a new rule.
The Court held that if a federal plaintiff forgoes the opportunity
to seek appellate review in the state courts, he forfeits his right to
ask the federal district court for affirmative relief. 2 °
This rule cannot be understood in terms of the interests set forth
to support the no-prosecution-pending bar. State proceedings are
not stopped in midair. The justification for the appellate-exhaustion
requirement was thus articulated under a new rationale: the neces-
sity of preserving the opportunity of state appellate courts to super-
vise the trial courts of their jurisdiction.'' But, of course, more had
to be at stake; state appellate supervision is a "good thing," but if
it denies a citizen the choice of forum to adjudicate his grievance,
it is not clear why the appellate-supervision function should prevail,
120. Justice Rehinquist's language in Huffman has an unnerving quality:
While appellee had the option to appeal in state courts at the time it filed this
action, we do not know for certain whether such remedy remained available at the
time the District Court issued its permanent injunction, or whether it remains
available now. In any event, appellee may not avoid the standards of Younger by
simply failing to comply with the procedures of perfecting its appeal within the
Ohio judicial system.
420 U.S. at 611 n.22.
121. Id. at 609.
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especially when the countervailing value seems to have a secure statu-
tory base in § 1983. The appellate-supervision theory can justify the
denial of access only if we postulate two other values: (a) a desire
to shift the burden of the procedural system so that the plaintiff's
chances of winning are reduced, or (b) a desire to make the state
courts the primary adjudicatory institution in the country for fed-
eral as well as state claims. Neither desire can be adequately defended.
The first impeaches the supposed neutrality of procedural rules.
The second cannot be supported by the usual interests served by
federalism, the need for decentralization, respect for local community
norms, and the encouragement of local experimentation. Since inter-
pretation of the federal Constitution is at stake, national uniformity
would appear a necessity rather than a luxury. Nor can the desire
to make the state courts the nation's primary adjudicatory institutions
be based on considerations of efficiency; total work load is not re-
duced, but only redistributed from the federal to the state courts,
and there is no reason to believe that the latter can handle the work
more effectively. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Huffman did not
seek to defend either value; it did not even acknowledge them.
To be certain, the Huffman exhaustion rule will not fully effectu-
ate either of these postulated desires, for the plaintiff apparently has
the right to return to the federal court after completing the state
process. But perhaps Justice Rehnquist was counting on delay-the
statute would remain in force until the appellate review was com-
pleted; on attrition-the forced journey through the state courts
might exhaust the citizen grievant; or possibly on preclusion-the citi-
zen might be precluded from adjudicating afresh in federal court
the issues he was obliged to litigate in state courts in defending the
state prosecution or proceeding.1'22 Indeed Justice Rehnquist alluded
122. The "normal rules" of res judicata and collateral estoppel would seem to pre-
clude relitigation once the citizen's claim that the statute was unconstitutional had
been heard in the state courts, even though the claim was tendered in a defensive
posture. The question is whether there are exceptional circumstances in litigative se-
quences such as Hunfinan that would warrant a departure from the normal rules. Such
circumstances might be found in the sanction imposed on the citizen and considerations of
federalism.
If the state proceeding results in imprisonment, the citizen can raise his claim in a
federal habeas proceeding, and that remedy has been viewed as exempt from the
normal rules of preclusion; such was the teaching of Fay -. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, .421-21
(1963). Fay seems to have been limited more recently by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 46,)
(1976), but the rule of Stone might not he applicable to a claim challenging the constitu-
tionality of the underlying statute.
Even if the state proceeding is a civil one, or if for some other reason the habeas
remedy is not available, an exception from the ordinary rules of preclusion might be
found in considerations of federalism, in a desire to preserve the citizen's right to choose
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to this last possibility in footnote 18 of Huffman: "We in no way
intend to suggest . . . that the normal rules of res judicata and ju-
dicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceed-
ings." 123 This was no light matter, even for the Burger Court, and
accordingly Justice Rehnquist postponed a final resolution of the
issue: the state "did not plead res judicata in the District Court,
and it is therefore not available to them here." 124 The tip to the
state for future cases was provided.
Admittedly, the exhaustion rule of Huffman has two limitations.
In the first place, Huffman appears limited to ongoing state proceed-
ings. The Huffman state proceeding was an injunctive proceeding,
and the state trial court injunction was still in effect when the fed-
eral suit was filed.1 2 5 There was no emphasis on this circumstance in
Huffman itself; Justice Rehnquist did not invoke it in justification
of the exhaustion requirement, and it has little to do with the justifi-
cation he did employ, the appellate-supervisory one. Nevertheless, in
its latest pronouncement on the issue, Wooley v. Maynard, 26 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for a six-man majority, saw this circumstance
as central to Huff man.
In Wooley a Jehovah's Witness had been convicted three times of
violating a New Hampshire law requiring license plates to bear the
state motto, "Live Free or Die." For the first offense the Witness
was fined $25; for the second he served 15 days in jail; and for the
third, the conviction was "continued for sentence."' 7 In no instance
did he appeal. Instead, like the theater owner in Huffman, he, along
with his wife, brought a federal suit seeking injunctive and declara-
tory relief against enforcement of the state statute.
Chief Justice Burger thought the Wooley suit did not fall within
the Huffman exhaustion requirement because "the relief sought is
wholly prospective."' *2 8 He noted that the Witness had already served
the federal forum to adjudicate his grievance against the state. See REs-iATEMENT (SEC-
o,) Ot, JUD(.;MLtTS § 68.1(c), (e) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) (new determination of issue
"'warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in
the two courts or to factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them,"
or warranted **by impact of determination on the public interest"). But this reasoning
ii not likely to be persuasive to a Court motivated by the spirit of "Our Federalism"
evidenced in Huffman itself.
123. 420 U.S. at 606 n.18.
124. Id. at 607 n.19.
125. Id. at 608.
126. 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977).
127. Id. at 1432.
128. Id. at 1433.
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the sentence on two of the convictions; the fact that the sentencing
of the third had been "continued" was explained away in a most
unhelpful fashion. 12 9 The Chief Justice emphasized the first two con-
victions, and observed that the plaintiff "does not seek to have his
record expunged, nor to annul any collateral effects those convictions
may have, e.g., upon his driving privileges."'13 We were not told
whether this restriction of federal relief merely stemmed from a limi-
tation in the plaintiff's existing prayer for relief; nor were we told
why the plaintiff should not have his record "expunged" and the
collateral effects "annulled" once the state statute was declared invalid.
I am thus left with the strong impression that Wooley was but a
subsequent gloss on the Huffman exhaustion requirement, a late
discovery by some of the Justices of its vast implications. It was an
attempt to limit Huffman-an attempt that is marred by its strained
quality (the determination to ignore the third conviction), by its
essential ambiguities (a failure to specify what kinds of collateral
effects would be sufficient to precipitate the Huffman bar), and by
the absence of any theoretical foundation (a failure to relate Wooley
to the appellate-supervisory rationale of Huffman). A line not sup-
ported by reason is not likely to remain straight.
The second limitation on the Huffman exhaustion requirement is
that it is addressed to state appellate remedies. The rule of Monroe
v. Pape,'3' relieving the § 1983 litigant from exhausting state trial
remedies before turning to the federal trial courts, thus seems pre-
served.' 32 But that concession may well be an illusion given the no-
prosecution-pending bar and the reverse removal power of Hicks v.
Miranda. If a prosecution is pending at the time the federal suit is
to be commenced, or if a state prosecution is commenced soon after,
the citizen appears remitted to the state courts for the adjudication
of his federal constitutional claim. Monroe v. Pape, like Dombrowski,
may soon be but a formal vestige of another era.133
129. The Chief Justice handled the issue by simply quoting the finding of the federal
district court that "'[n]o collateral consequences will attach' " to the third offense un-
less the plaintiff is arrested and prosecuted for a fourth time. Id. at 1433 n.8. He did
not explain why the continuing possibility of an amplified sanction did not bring the
plaintiff's case within the Huffman bar. This possibility was predicated upon the con-
stitutionality of the underlying New Hampshire statute, just as the continuing injunction
in Huffman was predicated upon the constitutionality of Ohio nuisance law (as applied).
130. Id. at 1433.
131. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). For the application of the rule in the injunctive context,
see McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
132. See 420 U.S. at 609 n.21.
133. Compare footnote 21 of Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609 n.21, with footnote 16 of
Vail, 97 S. Ct. at 1219 n.16.
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Huffman, like Hicks, ravages the vision of federalism that under-
lay Dombrowski. This is revealed not just by what it did, but by
what it said-not just by the technical rules, but by the reasons of-
fered in defense of them. When the plaintiff in Huffman sought to
take advantage of a traditional exception to exhaustion requirements,
claiming that in the light of a recent decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court an appeal would be "futile,"'13 4 Justice Rehnquist countered
by distinguishing the Ohio precedent from the plaintiff's claim. He
also rebuked the plaintiff for trying to make the kind of prediction
that every litigator must about the likelihood of success. Then Jus-
tice Rehnquist added:
Appellee obviously believes itself possessed of a viable federal
claim, else it would not so assiduously seek to litigate it in the
District Court. Yet, Art. VI of the United States Constitution
declares that "the Judges in every State shall be bound" by the
Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. Appellee is in truth urg-
ing us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not
be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities. This we re-
fuse to do.'3 5
This statement, above all else, marks the distance that we have come
from Dombrowski. It takes us back to what Justice Harlan claimed
was the real but implicit premise of Dombrowski-the view that the
citizen was entitled to act on his belief that state judges could not
be trusted. That premise has vanished, and it has been replaced by
its opposite, openly proclaimed.
B. The Fate of the Injunction
The no-prosecution-pending bar has proved a broad avenue for
retrenchment. The fate of the second aspect of Justice Brennan's
Perez strategy, the shift from injunctions to declaratory relief, is
harder to characterize. The Court is working toward the essential
insight that there are many different types of injunctions, and it has
begun to formulate different rules for different types. The crucial
distinction has not been any of the traditional ones, those between
interlocutory and final injunctions or between mandatory and pro-
hibitory injunctions, but rather it has been the distinction between
what I will call statutory and administrative injunctions.1 36
134. 420 U.S. at 610.
135. Id. at 610-11.
136. These concepts are introduced in slightly different terms in O. FIss, INJUNCrIONS
1, 51, 325-99, 415-76 (1972).
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The statutory injunction seeks to establish a new norm of behav-
ior. The prototype, and thus the source of its name, is an injunction
against the enforcement of a statute on its face. The injunction in
Dombrowski against the enforcement of the constitutionally over-
broad Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law
is an example of the statutory injunction. So would be an injunction,
such as that in Douglas, against the enforcement of a statute as ap-
plied. Crucial is the legal determination that a certain identifiable
pattern of behavior is constitutionally protected, not to be punished
by criminal statute.
The administrative injunction, by contrast, is more ambitious. It
attempts to change actual behavior. The prototype is the injunction
against an administrative officer, seeking to prevent conduct such as
police brutality that is proscribed by statute and the Constitution. In
such cases, the behavioral norms are already articulated in the law;
the difficulty is in the implementation of those norms. One common
form of administrative injunction attempts to implement general,
well-established standards (e.g., do not discriminate on the basis of
race, or do not restrain trade) by placing a defendant under increas-
ingly more specific regulatory constraints. 137 Another type, best ex-
emplified by a school desegregation decree, seeks to reorganize an
ongoing social institution. 138 In both types of administrative injunc-
tions the practical focus is not on the issuance of the decree, as it is
for the statutory injunction, but on its enforcement. An administrative
decree requires a long continuing relationship between the equity
court and the parties, in which initial directives are modified in light
of changed conditions or new insights.
139
1. The Implications of Steffel for the Statutory Injunction
Because the statutory injunction is essentially the medium through
which a court announces a legal standard of behavior, it fundamentally
resembles a declaratory judgment. The statutory injunction, unlike
the declaratory judgment, contains a threat of sanction, but the threat
is largely unnecessary. The primary question will be the legal validity
of a statute, and it is unlikely that a court will need to use its con-
tempt power to enforce its decree. Accordingly, one would expect
the access rules for statutory injunctions to be roughly the same as
those for declaratory judgments, and the Court has fulfilled this ex-
pectation.
137. I have elsewhere termed this a "regulatory" injunction. See id. at 1, 325-414.
138. I have called these "structural" injunctions. See id. at 1, 415-81.
139. See id. at 325-481.
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The first step in this direction occurred in the context of an inter-
locutory statutory injunction. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. °40 a fed-
eral district court had issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
enforcement of a local ordinance pending the final resolution of the
case in federal court.14 ' Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, re-
fused to uphold the injunction with respect to one of the plaintiffs
against whom there was a pending prosecution. Yet he did uphold it
for those against whom no prosecution was pending, emphasizing
that the relief was interlocutory and would last only for the duration
of the federal court hearing on the request for final relief against
the ordinance. He noted that these plaintiffs had met the traditional
prerequisites for a preliminary injunction, demonstrating both ir-
reparable injury (substantial loss of business and possible bankruptcy)
and a likelihood of success on the merits. He stressed the lax "abuse
of discretion" standard of appellate review of preliminary injunctions,
the "stringent" safeguards surrounding their issuance, and the fact that
interlocutory relief would extend only to the named plaintiffs and
not otherwise interfere with the town's enforcement of the contested
ordinance.
As a first step the stress upon the interlocutory and temporary
quality of the statutory injunction was logical: relief entailed only
a momentary suspension of the statute. So was the explicit reserva-
tion of the question left open in Younger and Steffel, whether there
would be access for a final injunction when no prosecution was
pending.142 But with Steffel and Salem Inn on the books, the next
step-bringing final statutory injunctions under the access rules for
declaratory judgments-seemed small and almost predictable. The
Court took that step in the spring of 1977 in a second part of Wooley
v. Maynard,'4" and did so in a way that undermined the irreparable
injury requirement for final statutory injunctions and personalized
the threat of contempt to enhance the similarity between a statutory
injunction and a declaratory judgment.
Though the same phrase is used, the irreparable injury require-
ment has a different meaning for interlocutory and final injunctions.
140. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
141. Plaintiffs were three corporations operating topless bars. The bars had sus-
pended topless dancing when a local ordinance prohibiting it took effect, and chal-
lenged the ordinance in federal district court, asking for declaratory and injunctive
relief. When the district court declined to issue a temporary restraining order, one bar
resumed topless dancing and was promptly served with a criminal summons. The other
two bars refrained until the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 924-25.
142. Id. at 930.
143. 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977).
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An interlocutory injunction issues after an irregular proceeding in
which notice may not have been provided and the opportunity for
development of the facts and law is truncated. The irreparable in-
jury requirement measures the justification for such irregular relief
by comparing a plaintiff's potential injuries during a lawsuit against
the possibility of his being made whole at the end through some
form of final relief. For a final injunction, however, the irreparable
injury requirement serves no such function. In Douglas and again
in Younger it was used as a device to protect the values of "Our
Federalism." But since the Court had already acknowledged in Sieffel
that a declaratory judgment was a presumptively available remedy,
and since the statutory injunction was in large measure the functional
equivalent of a declaratory judgment, the irreparable injury require-
ment was left without a rationale when applied to a final statutory
injunction. In Wooley the requirement was nominally preserved, but
in fact drained of much of its vitality.
The majority in Wooley approved the issuance of a final injunction
prohibiting the named defendants from arresting or prosecuting the
federal plaintiffs for masking that portion of their license plates that
contained the motto "Live Free or Die." The majority stressed the
impact the threat of such future prosecutions would have on the
plaintiffs' ability "to perform the ordinary tasks of daily life which
require an automobile."' 144 For the majority this was irreparable in-
jury "sufficient to justify injunctive relief."' 14 Justice White, how-
ever, argued that Douglas v. City of Jeannette required that only
declaratory relief be granted, since great and immediate irreparable
injury had not been demonstrated:
[T]he State's enforcement of its statute prior to the declaration
of unconstitutionality by the federal court would appear to be
no more than the performance of their duty by the State's law
enforcement officers. If doing this much prior to the declaration
of unconstitutionality amounts to unusual circumstances suffi-
cient to warrant an injunction, the standard is obviously seriously
eroded.-' ;
Justice White was entirely correct: the teeth had been removed from
the irreparable injury requirement. Wooley essentially placed the
final statutory injunction under the no-prosecution-pending rule of
Steffel.
144. Id. at 1434.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1437 (White, J., dissenting).
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Wooley's assimilation of the access rules of a final statutory injunc-
tion to those of a declaratory judgment was supported by the ex-
treme personalization of its final decree. The Court in Wooley decided
a broad proposition of constitutional law:
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dis-
semination of an ideological message by displaying it on his pri-
vate property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be
observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may not
do so.14 7
Yet the Court upheld a decree issued by the district court that only
forbade the named defendants from arresting or prosecuting the
named plaintiffs under the statute. Thus the threat of contempt
would attach only when three New Hampshire officials, the Chief
of Police of Lebanon, the Commissioner of the State Department of
Motor Vehicles, and the Director of the State Police, and their sub-
ordinates attempted to enforce the statute against George and Maxine
Maynard.148 Such relief contrasts sharply with the broad injunction
apparently contemplated by Dombrowski, "prohibiting further acts
enforcing the sections of the Subversive Activities and Communist
Control Law here found void on their face."'
1 49
The restricted scope of the Wooley injunction might be based on
traditional procedural norms, confining the benefits and burden of
an injunction to the named parties.150 It might also be seen as a ges-
ture on behalf of "Our Federalism," avoiding the offense to state
officials that might otherwise arise from broadening the threat of
the contempt sanction. The personalized injunction threatens con-
tempt only for the actions of the named defendants, and only with
respect to the named plaintiffs, otherwise trusting the state not to
enforce the void statute. For the remaining citizens of New Hampshire,
it was as if the Supreme Court had issued a declaratory judgment.
Personalization thus worked a marvelous compromise. A toe-hold
was secured for the final statutory injunction; relief as effective as
the declaratory judgments authorized by Steffel was provided; and
147. Id. at 1434-35.
148. The Court stated loosely: "[w]e conclude that the State of New Hampshire may
not require appellees to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates ....
Id. at 1436 (footnote omitted). In fact, however, the Court merely affirmed the district
court's decree, which was directed only at tile named defendants. 406 F. Supp. 1381,
1389 (D. N.H. 1976). The defendants were represented by the office of the Attorney
General of the State of New Hampshire.
149. 380 U.S. at 497-98.
150. Sce 0. Fiss, INJUNcTIONs 482-702 (1972).
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at the same time, personalization gave comfort to some of the sub-
scribers to "Our Federalism," compensating for the erosion of the
irreparable injury requirement. Once personalized, the statutory in-
junction could be seen as having no greater systemic effect on federal-
state relations than the declaratory judgments authorized by Steffel.
2. The Implications of "Our Federalism" for the
Administrative Injunction
Administrative injunctions are especially intrusive. They intro-
duce a dimension of supervision and oversight not present with
declaratory judgments or statutory injunctions. Administrative de-
crees typically embody standards of conduct so general as to acquire
their meaning only in specific application to particular aspects of
a defendant's conduct, and inject a court into the middle of ongoing
social relationships that are neither easy to alter nor easy to under-
stand. As a result, administrative injunctions involve close monitoring
of a defendant's performance over long periods of time, continual
intervention to increase the specificity and otherwise modify earlier
decrees, and the creation of adjunct agencies to assist in the policing
of performance.
At the time of Dombrowski, access to federal court was assumed
for administrative injunctions against state officials. One need think
only of the school desegTegation or voting rights cases. Ironically,
access for such suits seemed much more evident than for those seek-
ing an injunction against a state criminal statute. No one thought
that the federalist rule of Douglas v. City of Jeannette had any rele-
vance to school desegregation or voting rights injunctions. In part,
this was because the criminal defense appeared to be a clear remedial
alternative to a federal injunctive suit of the statutory variety. The
only alternative to a federal school desegregation or voting rights
suit, however, would have been a request for an injunction from the
state courts, entrusting them with the tasks of concretizing the con-
stitutional ideal of equality and obtaining compliance with these
norms. From the standpoint of the theory of federalism underlying
Douglas that might have made sense, but it was impossible to get
an assist from the traditions of equity because there was no available
adequate alternative remedy at law. A denial of access to the federal
courts would have had to have been exclusively predicated on pre-
Civil War, states' rights federalist notions, and that would have been
intellectually intolerable to the Warren Court.
The preferred position for administrative injunctions in the mid-
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1960s also derived from the fact that the Warren Court had a very
special investment in school desegregation-its very being was tied
up with the viability and implementation of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.151 In the state courts Brown would collapse. Indeed, in the
late 1950s, a few days before the Little Rock crisis, the state supreme
court chief justices passed a resolution that criticized the Court for
overriding states' rights. This was understood as a defiant attack on
Brown,12 and the bitter memory of this event bore heavily on the
Justices-at least in 1965.
The commitment to Brown ensured federal access for school de-
segregation suits. It also had implications for administrative injunc-
tions in general. By the time of the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Brown was accepted into the legal and popular culture
as legitimate,153 so much so that it began to function as an axiom.
In the lower courts it yielded arguments of this nature: "This use
of injunctive power is analogous to that of Brown, and therefore it
is permissible." As a consequence federal court access was assumed
for administrative decrees reaching state prisons and mental hospitals,
public housing projects, and local police departments.
By the mid-1970s, however, the Justices personally committed to
Brown had begun to retire, the integrative ideal embodied in school
desegregation decrees had become controversial,:1 4 and the legal com-
munity was obtaining a fuller appreciation of the difficulties of ad-
ministrative injunctions.'5- As a result Brown began to lose its axiom-
151. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
152. Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices,
at 23 (Aug. 19-24, 1958) (Council of State Governments publication) [hereinafter cited
as Proceedings]. The attack on Brown was somewhat disingenuously denied in the min-
utes of the Proceedings, id. at 24, yet Chief Justice Charles Jones of Pennsylvania surely
had a more accurate appraisal of the political realities of the occasion when he noted
during the debates that the issue of school desegregation was "'quietly embedded in
the resolution.'" N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1958, at 1, col. 5; see Proceedings, supra at 29-30.
The Conference of Chief Justices met at Pasadena, California. At roughly the same
time, the American Bar Association was holding its annual meeting in nearby Los
Angeles; its guests included Justices Brennan and Clark, as well as Chief Justice Warren.
Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1958, § A, at 8, col. 1. Scarcely two days after the state chief
justices' assault on the Court, Chief Justice Warren, still in Los Angeles, called an
extraordinary session of the Court to deal with the Little Rock crisis. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1958, at 1, col. 1.
153. See Fiss, The Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law
in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1974).
154. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing,
39 LAw & CONrEIP. PROB. 194, 200-04 (1975).
155. See, e.g., M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL
DECREEs IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS (1976); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARP. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Comment, The Limits of Litigation: Pub-
lic Housing Site Selection and the Failure of Injunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1330
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atic power. It was to be tolerated, but only as an exception. In
addition, the banner of "Our Federalism" signaled a new respect-
ability for explicitly antinationalist principles, thus endangering fed-
eral administrative injunctions aimed at state officials. The Burger
Court has managed to reverse the relative availability of adminis-
trative and statutory injunctions: it has thrown across the former bars
even greater than the no-prosecution-pending rule.
The first step in that direction manifested itself in the Littleton
litigation. The case concerned Cairo, Illinois, where since the 1960s
blacks had protested denial of their civil rights in employment, hous-
ing, and education. More recently they had embarked on an economic
boycott of merchants engaged in racial discrimination. Tension and
antagonism grew in the community, and many of the protestors were
arrested and prosecuted. An injunctive suit was commenced in federal
court. The suit sought an injunction against the local prosecutor re-
quiring him to prosecute whites as vigorously as blacks, and prohibit-
ing him from prosecuting blacks because of their race or civil rights
activity. The suit also sought an injunction against a local judge and
magistrate, requiring them to make bail determinations on an indi-
vidualized basis and prohibiting them from discriminating on the
basis of race when setting bail or sentencing.
Justice White wrote for the Court in Littleton, and there were
three strands to his strategy. The first was to avoid a decision on
the request for relief against the prosecutor. He accomplished this by
dividing the single suit into two, one against the judge and magistrate,
O'Shea v. Littleton,56 and one against the prosecutor, Spomer v.
Littleton,157 and by eliminating the latter on the ground that there
was an intervening change in office. The plaintiffs had sued the then-
incumbent prosecutor, Berbling; after a decision by the court of
appeals approving the injunction, a new prosecutor, Spomer, was
elected. The Court held that since plaintiffs had never charged
Spomer personally with anything, the case should be remanded for
a determination as to its mootness.
In this disposition the Court may have undermined an injunctive
doctrine of proven utility concerning succession in public office. That
doctrine-reflected in Federal Rule 25(d)158 and its equivalent, Su-
(1974); Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975); 0. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction, Addison C.
Harris Memorial Lectures, Indiana University (Apr. 5, 6, 1976) (manuscript on file with
Yale Law Journal).
156. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
157. 414 U.S. 514 (1974).
158. FaD. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1).
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preme Court Rule 48(3)lao9-allowed the misconduct of predecessors
to be attributed to incumbents and automatically substituted suc-
cessors as defendants in suits against public officials.' 6 0 In the typical
school desegregation suit, for example, it was not necessary to show
that the incumbent superintendent and board members were guilty
of wrongdoing; it was sufficient if their predecessors were guilty of
discrimination. Similarly, once an injunction was issued, the plain-
tiffs were not required to show a continuation of policy each time
the school board membership had changed or a superintendent had
been replaced; rather the burden of showing a discontinuation of
policies was placed on the defendant. The doctrine of substitution of
public officials reflects an intent to make injunctions effective over
time. Normally an administrative injunction must be in force for a
number of years. Moreover, the doctrine manifests an appreciation
that administrative injunctions are not aimed at individuals but at
those occupying official positions, and that official behavior is largely
determined by the structure of the institution-by its traditions, by
the nature and quality of the mechanisms to ensure accountability,
and by the social context in which the institution operates.
The remand in Spomer v. Littleton dealt a blow of unspecified
dimensions to this doctrine. Even more striking is the fact that the
Court treated a change in office like a jurisdictional defect, incapable
of party waiver, secreted up the Court's sleeve, to be played to trump
unsuspecting litigants. The issue was not raised; on the contrary,
Spomer substituted himself for Berbling as party defendant and (un-
wittingly) insisted that he fully intended to pursue Berbling's pol-
icies. 16 The Court did not even call for briefs on the issue. This
mode of proceeding was as questionable as the decision itself, and
there is no comfort to be gained from the willingness of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas to subscribe to it.102 Both wings of
159. Sur. CT. R. 48(3).
160. See generally Comment, Substitution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(d): Mootness and Related Problems, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 192 (1975).
161. 414 U.S. at 522 n.10.
162. Justice Douglas had originally protested the promulgation of the automatic
substitution rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 25(d), 368 U.S. 1012-14 (1961), and that may explain
his vote here. However, his views were expressed long before the necessities of school
and voting decrees had been fully understood. It should also be noted that in Spomer
the succession problem arose prior to entry of the decree, and that might be a basis
of limitation. Cf. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 177-81 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J.) (permitting decree to bind a successor employer notwithstanding FED. R. Civ.
P. 65(d), which provides that restraining orders and injunctions shall be "binding
only upon parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise").
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the Court seemed intent to avoid the risks that inhered in reconciling
the tenets of "Our Federalism" with a request for an administrative
injunction aimed at prosecutorial behavior that seemed akin to bad-
faith harassment.
Younger had sought to reduce Dombrowski to a rule assuring ac-
cess for claims of bad-faith harassment, and in doing so, made such
claims an exception to the no-prosecution-pending bar. It was now
fully understood, however, that an injunction founded on such a
claim, at least as presented in Spomer v. Littleton, would have re-
quired a federal court to supervise closely the actual behavior of a
state officer over a long period of time. The challenge to "Our Fed-
eralism" was clear and the Justices sensed their exposure-either com-
promise "Our Federalism" or impeach the Younger exception for
bad-faith harassment. The remand in Spomer v. Littleton was appar-
ently a response to this dilemma, and the damage to the succession in
public office doctrine an ill-considered and unfortunate byproduct.
Turning his attention to the claim against the Cairo magistrate
and judge, the claim presented in O'Shea v. Littleton, Justice White
executed the second strand of his strategy, which was to deploy the
squeeze play of Dombrowski and Younger. By this time the imminency
requirement had been assimilated to an Article III case-or-controversy
requirement; Justice White preserved this tradition, and then ap-
plied the requirement with a stringency that provoked a vigorous
dissent from Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. There were
allegations in the complaint clearly indicating the current racial tur-
moil in Cairo and the past wrongs suffered by the plaintiffs, and yet
Justice White treated the plaintiffs' claims of future harm as mere
"speculation and conjecture."'' 3 Indeed, with a serenity that I find
disturbing, Justice White as much as said in O'Shea that the immi-
nency requirement would be satisfied only if a prosecution were pend-
ing, and then of course access would be barred by Younger (or, if
the plaintiffs were in custody, by Preiser v. Rodriguez).
0 4
Because the existence of a case or controversy involved factual
questions, Justice White, perhaps to avoid whatever interference with
state processes would be entailed by an evidentiary hearing on the
Article III-imminency issue, turned to the question of what would
163. 414 U.S. at 497.
164. 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Preiser held that when a state prisoner challenges "the
very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determina-
tion that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprison-
ment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Federal habeas requires that
the prisoner-applicant first exhaust state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
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constitute irreparable injury if no prosecution were pending.16 5 This
was the third strand of Justice White's strategy. He ruled that the
plaintiffs did not allege sufficient irreparable injury, and thereby
avoided the hearing on the Article III-imminency issue, and fore-
closed the possibility of amending the complaint to meet that re-
quirement.
For the new majority, committed to the "Our Federalism" of
Younger and to limitation of federal intervention in state court pro-
ceedings, the administrative injunction sought in O'Shea v. Littleton
was a monstrosity: plaintiffs sought, as Justice White fairly described
it, "an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings,"'-6 6 an
intrusion into the state judicial sphere so massive as to dwarf the
mere enjoining of a prosecution proscribed by Younger. What is of
particular interest, however, is Justice White's use of the irreparable
injury doctrine. In contrast to Chief Justice Burger's later treatment
of that doctrine with respect to the statutory injunction requested
in Wooley, in O'Shea v. Littleton Justice White used the irreparable
injury requirement with a vengeance. He extracted it from its original
statutory context in Douglas, the overbreadth branch of Dombrowski,
and Younger; and now used it against an administrative injunction.
In Douglas, Dornbrowski, and Younger, the availability of an in-
junction was dependent upon a showing of inadequate alternative
remedies at law. In practice, however, the inadequacy of only a single
alternative remedy was considered, the defense to a state criminal pros-
ecution. But in O'Shea v. Littleton Justice White laid out an entire
laundry list of additional alternative remedies which must be shown
to be inadequate: substitution or removal of the judge, change of
venue, review on direct appeal, habeas corpus, even prosecution by
the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 242!167 Further, Justice White
165. This astonished Justice Blackmun, who could not understand how Justice
White, having just posited an Article III jurisdictional defect, could go on to the merits.
414 U.S. at 504-05.
166. Id. at 500. Justice White wrote:
An injunction of the type contemplated by respondents and the Court of Appeals
would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state courts via resort to the
federal suit for determination of the claim ab initio, just as would the request for
injunctive relief from an ongoing state prosecution against the federal plaintiff
which was found to be unwarranted in Younger. Moreover, it would require for
its enforcement the continuous supervision by the federal court over the conduct
of the petitioners . . . involving any of the members of the respondents' broadly
defined class.
Id. at 501 (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 502-03. Section 242 authorizes criminal prosecutions against those who
under cover of law deprive a person of "rights . . . secured ...by the Constitution or
laws of the United States" or subject a person to additional punishment because of
his race. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
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added a presumption of adequacy to all of the alternative remedies.
He listed each one without questioning its effectiveness in terms of
the plaintiffs: How were they supposed to initiate a federal criminal
prosecution? Were they to stay content until they were imprisoned
and could avail themselves of habeas? The adequacy of these alterna-
tive remedies was evidently to be presumed from the very fact that
Justice White was able to think of them. He stressed further that to
justify an injunction plaintiffs' irreparable injury must be "'both great
and immediate.' "68 In light of all this, it is hard to see how any injunc-
tions could ever issue. In effect, Justice White turned the equitable
doctrines of Dombrowski inside out. Irreparable injury had become
an impassable bar.
Arguably this constriction of the administrative injunction was
meant only for the extraordinary case presented by O'Shea v. Littleton,
involving an attack on the practices of the state judiciary itself. O'Shea
v. Littleton might have been thought to be the injunctive counter-
part to the immunity from damage judgments created by Pierson v.
Ray;1 9 it might have simply reflected the fact that judges usually
obtain a special status in doctrines they make for themselves.Y0 Or
it might have been thought that the concerns of "Our Federalism"
were rooted in a particular solicitude for state judicial systems, which
in turn accounted for the denial of access in O'Shea v. Littleton. But
with the benefit of hindsight, all that is but wishful thinking. Last
Term the Court gave a clear signal that the logic of "Our Federalism"
could not be confined, and that federal access for administrative in-
junctions aimed at any state officials was to be curtailed.
That signal, of course, was Rizzo v. Goode."' The suit in Rizzo
primarily sought to protect minorities in Philadelphia from police
misconduct. The plaintiffs' case was modeled on the typical civil
rights litigation of the 1960s; it focused on a series of incidents of
police misconduct as a means of establishing a pattern or practice of
such misconduct. 72 This proof, the district court found, not only
168. 414 U.S. at 499 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971), which in
turn had quoted Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
169. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
170. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
171. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
172. According to Justice Rehnquist, the district court had held that the plaintiff had
made out a successful action for relief by showing "an 'unacceptably high' number
of [incidents of police misconduct] of constitutional dimension-some 20 in all-occurring
at large in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7,500 policemen." Id. at 373. He
distinguished the district court's "unadorned finding of a statistical pattern" in this
police misconduct, id. at 375, from the situations in Hague V. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939),
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), and Lankford v. Geltson, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.
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revealed that there was a significant danger posed by the actions of
individual police officers, but also that supervisory officers-such as
the City Police Commissioner-had failed in their duties. This find-
ing, plus a desire to obtain the most effective and yet least intrusive
remedy, led the district court to address its decree to the supervising
officers, not to the individual police officers. 173 The district court
ordered the supervising officers to revise police manuals and to draft
"a comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen
complaints."'174 The proposed program had to include adjudication
by "an impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable
from chain of command pressures."'1 7z
This technique of first having the defendant draft the proposed
relief to be entered against it-the plan-submission technique-was
modeled after the school desegregation cases. From that experience
we know that its minimalist quality is but an illusion. After submis-
sion of the draft program, the plaintiff will have the opportunity to
object. Undoubtedly there will be defects in the submission, and the
district court will have to rule on those objections, and in all like-
lihood will probably have to construct its own decree (based on sub-
missions). The plan-submission technique might be understood as an
attempt to capitalize on the expertise of the defendant, but more
often than not the dynamics that led to the initial violation prevent
the defendant from using its expertise effectively to control its own
behavior. Moreover, even after an appropriate program is designed
and the defendant ordered to abide by it, jurisdiction must be re-
tained to determine whether the decree is being fully implemented
and whether it is adequate to eliminate the pattern of misconduct.
1966), which involved not simply a large number of violations, but "a 'pervasive pattern
of intimidation' flowing from a deliberate plan by the named defendants," 423 U.S. at
375 (emphasis in original). This provides one avenue for limiting Rizzo, assuming this
language can be taken at its face value, which I doubt. Justice Blackmun surely had
a better understanding of the structure of the proof in Rizzo itself. He wrote:
Small as the ratio of incidents to arrests may be, the District Court nevertheless
found a pattern of operation, even if no policy, and one sufficiently significant that
violations "cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances." 357 F. Supp., at 1319.
. . . The Court's criticism about numbers would be just as forceful, or would miss
the mark just as much, with 100 incidents or 500 or even 3,000, when compared
with the overall number of arrests made in the city of Philadelphia. The pattern
line will appear somewhere. The District Court drew it this side of the number
of proved instances.
Id. at 383-84.
173. Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsi-
bility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1318-20 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aJJ'd in relevant part, 506 F.2d
542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
174. Id. at 1322.
175. Id. at 1321.
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If not, supplemental relief will be needed. The cycle would then
repeat itself.'
7 6
The Rizzo Court was well aware of the"-reality of this injunctive
intervention and determined to have no part of it. The majority was
almost the same as in O'Shea v. Littleton-Justices White, Stewart,
Rehnquist, Burger, and Powell (only Justice Blackmun, who in any
event separately concurred in O'Shea, broke ranks and wrote the dis-
sent in Rizzo). Justice Rehnquist spoke for the Court.
Justice Rehnquist began by expressing doubts that the plaintiffs
met the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III; he thought
they had failed to show a "real and immediate threat of repeated
injury." 1  He emphasized the improbability of such a showing since
the alleged future perpetrators-the individual policemen-remained
"unnamed" and "unknown" and the risk of future injury was al-
legedly linked to the absence of adequate disciplinary procedures. The
plaintiffs, he said, could only offer speculation as to what "one of a
small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future
because of that unknown policeman's perception of departmental dis-
ciplinary procedures."'
78
Rizzo was brought as a class action, commenced by 24 named indi-
viduals and two broad-based community organizations on behalf of
all the citizens of Philadelphia, but particularly the black population.
Once account is taken of the class character of the Rizzo suit, Justice
Rehnquist's Article III point appears less persuasive and indeed
less clear.
Justice Rehnquist's point might have been that, although there
were individuals in the class who were sufficiently subject to the risk
of future harm to have Article III standing, none of the named plain-
tiffs had demonstrated a sufficient personal risk to establish his own
standing. Justice Rehnquist quoted from O'Shea v. Littleton, which
held that " 'if none of the named plaintiffs ... establishes the requisite
of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief
on behalf of himself or any other member of the class' which they
purport to represent. 179
The difficulty is that Littleton was not settled precedent for this
holding. It was, for example, contradicted by a case decided a few
176. For a case study of the plan-submission technique in the Montgomery schools,
see 0. Fiss, INJUNcTIONs 415-84 (1972).
177. 423 U.S. at 372.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 373 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
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weeks after Littleton, Aflee v. Medrano, s0 which stated that a union
would have standing "to raise any of the claims that a member of the
union would have standing to raise."'' There was no suggestion in
Alilee that individual union members who were exposed to the risk
of future harm had to be named as plaintiffs, or even that they had
to be identified. Nor would any Article III policy be served by such
requirements. Accordingly, the concern in Rizzo should not have
been whether the 24 named individual plaintiffs would be subject
to police misconduct in the future, but, more importantly, whether
members of the two named organizations were likely to be so injured,
and whether the named organizations were adequate spokesmen for
their members.
Justice Rehnquist, however, might have been making a different
point. He might have been arguing that since the risk of future harm
to any single citizen was so low, no individual in the plaintiff class
had Article III standing. While such a position might have some basis
in a cold view of statistical probabilities, it has no foundation in
Article III policies or social reality. There is no reason why individual
risks cannot be aggregated.
Rizzo was essentially a suit between a group, the black citizens of
Philadelphia, and a local agency, the police department. The named
parties functioned as representatives of these social entities. If, as the
district court found, there was a pattern of police harassment directed
against the group, Article III should require only, first, that the
group is still at risk, and, second, that the named plaintiffs are ade-
quate representatives of the group. These were the standard require-
ments for school desegregation cases, at least before Justice Rehn-
quist started rewriting the law. 182 They assured sufficient adverseness
and at the same time made federal injunctive power available to curb
180, 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
181. Id. at 819 n.13. For an instance in which the Court allowed probable injury to
unnamed, unidentified members of a group or class to satisfy the Article III requirements,
see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 753-54 (1976) (pharmaceutical advertising). Note also those cases dismissing moot-
ness objections on the theory that the controversy continues to exist between the de-
fendant and the group that a plaintiff purports to represent even though his individual
claim has become moot: Franks v. Bowman Transport. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 (1976)
(employment discrimination); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); and Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401-03 (1975). In Sosna Justice White dissented, complaining of
the inconsistency with Littleton. 419 U.S. at 411-18 (White, J., dissenting).
182. Compare Ke)es v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (Brennan, J.); Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); and Green v. New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968) (Brennan, J.) with Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 429-31 (1976) (treating the United States as the only remaining plaintiff); and Board
of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975) (per curiam).
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unconstitutional action directed against social groups rather than
against identifiable individuals. 8 3
Strangely, Justice Rehnquist failed to carry his Article III argument
to its conclusion. Perhaps sensing the disarray of the precedents or
the vulnerability of his argument, he was content merely to express
"serious doubts" about the justiciability of the suit. He distinguished
Littleton on the grounds that Rizzo "did not arise on the pleadings.
The District Court, having certified the plaintiff classes, bridged the
gap between the facts shown at trial and the classwide relief sought
.... , But surely, given the Article III nature of his objections,
the fact of certification seems irrelevant. If Justice Rehnquist had
in fact located an Article III objection to the plaintiff side of the
lawsuit, neither the action of the parties nor that of the court below
would bar Supreme Court review of the issue. As Justice Rehnquist
is fond of reminding us, jurisdictional flaws are always open for re-
view-indeed that is why so many standard equitable doctrines are
given Article III status. It enhances the Supreme Court's capacity to
supervise the lower courts.
Since his rejection of plaintiffs' Article III status was not definitive,
Justice Rehnquist proceeded to other more decisive points. He re-
jected the plaintiffs' duty-of-supervision theory because, he asserted,
it was inconsistent with the language of § 1983 (which of course is
not true) 1s5 He finally came to rest on the federalism point. Justice
Rehnquist quoted from O'Shea v. Littleton, and cited his own opin-
ions in Salem Inn and Huffman, all of which served as the proxy for
the "Our Federalism" of Younger (a case that oddly was not cited).
Then he burst forth with his peroration:
Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important
part in governing the relationship between federal courts and
state governments, though initially expounded and perhaps en-
titled to their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to
enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited
183. My views on the group character of much of the school desegregation litigation
are elaborated in Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOpHY & PUB.
AFF. 107 (1976).
184. 423 U.S. at 373 (footnote omitted).
185. The language of § 1983 is strikingly comprehensive:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Cf. Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto!
De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 330-31 (1976) (discussing the action-inaction dis-
tinction in the context of school segregation).
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either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself.
We think these principles likewise have applicability where in-
junctive relief is sought not against the judicial branch of the
state government, but against those in charge of an executive
branch of an agency of state or local governments such as re-
spondents here. 8 6
Several lines later he softened this declaration-perhaps in exchange
for an additional vote-by emphasizing that what is involved here is
the "internal disciplinary affairs" of a state agency: "When it in-
jected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs
of this state agency, the District Court departed from these pre-
cepts." 18 7 But perhaps the emphasis is more mine than his, and in
any event the axiomatic shift embodied in Rizzo-especially when
read in conjunction with Hicks and Huffman-is unmistakable. The
axiom for the administrative injunction is now Younger and not
Brown. The district court was rebuked-indeed several times-for
saying that its power to enter such a decree was "firmly established."' ' s
What makes Rizzo so blunt is that its vision of federalism is not
masked behind the language of equity. "Irreparable injury"-so cen-
tral to the Littleton analysis-does not make an appearance in Rizzo.
At the most there is a catchall phrase invoking " 'the principles of
equity, comity, and federalism.' ",189 In striking contrast to Littleton,
there is no pretense that the federal injunctive remedy is being de-
nied because there is an alternative adequate remedy. The value
preference is more starkly embraced: even if no other remedy is avail-
able, the doors of the federal equity court will be closed.
This is a step forward, the frankness enhances accountability, yet
I question if the language has fully worked itself pure. "Federalism"
is closer to the mark than "irreparable injury"; but I wonder whether
"federalism" is itself being used as a proxy for another set of values.
I suspect that it is. I suspect that at the heart of Rizzo-and at the
heart of the progeny of "Our Federalism"-is more than a concern
that federal courts should not interfere in state agencies. I suspect
that at the heart of Rizzo there is a new version of laissez faire-one
specially tailored to the welfare state.' 90 It consists of a desire to in-
186. 423 U.S. at 380.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 371, 373-74, 376, 380.
189. Id. at 379 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)).
190. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
In his dissent in Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211, 1222-23 (1977), Justice Brennan noted
that the
Court in a series of decisions ... has shaped the doctrines of jurisdiction, justi-
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sulate the status quo from judicial interference, regardless of whether
the protected institution is a judicial system, legislature or adminis-
trative agency. I suspect that the overarching spirit of the Burger
Court is a hostility toward the activism of judges, not just federal
judges. "Federalism" is but one handle available to the Supreme
Court for curbing some of the more ambitious-more idealistic-
projects of its own judges.' 9 ' I am also willing to speculate that it is
this very purpose of the present majority of the Supreme Court that
so fundamentally alienates Justice Brennan-the activist judge par
excellence, prepared to use the judicial power for all its worth to
preserve constitutional rights like freedom of expression and racial
equality.
IV
The tactics of Justice Brennan's Perez opinion have borne bitter
fruit: the no-prosecution-pending rule has been used to cripple the
remaining aspirations of Dombrowski, while the shift in focus to de-
claratory relief has left the administrative injunction unprotected and
vulnerable. Brennan's maneuvers in Perez, however, were primarily
strategic, expressive of a distinct conception of judicial role, one of
judicial statesmanship, and it is as such that they must be evaluated.
The judicial statesman aspires to state his views authoritatively. By
this I do not mean that he intends merely to express his views, how-
ever clearly, cogently, and consistently. That would be to aspire only
to intellectual authority. The authority to which the statesman aspires
is that of positive law. He wishes to give his views the authoritative-
ness that comes from their being the views of the Court. Academics
have long glorified the judge who seeks no more than intellectual
ciability and remedy so as increasingly to bar the federal courthouse door to litigants
with substantial federal claims ...
These decisions have in common that they have been rendered in the name of
federalism. But they have given this great concept a distorted and disturbing mean-
ing. Under the banner of vague, undefined notions of equity, comity and federalism,
the Court has embarked upon the dangerous course of condoning both isolated
* * .and systematic .. .violations of civil liberties. Such decisions hardly bespeak
a true concern for equity. Nor do they properly reflect the nature of our federalism.
191. Other decisions especially illustrating this purpose are Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (attorneys fees unavailable, subsequently
curtailed by Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Vest
Supp. 1976)); Eisen v. Carlyle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (notice for class action);
and the standing cases, Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 426
U.S. 26 (1976), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1974). The Burger Court does appear
to condone judicial activism in the name of state autonomy. See National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Per-
mutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165
(1977).
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authority, and no wonder-they share with him a common conception
of professional role, with its emphasis on truth for its own sake, indi-
vidualism, and the absence of power. At the same time we have failed
to appreciate and understand the judge who seeks a different source
of authority. His contribution to our public life is no less vital, his
intellectual accomplishments no less impressive.
The judicial statesman has a grandiose view of the Court, a deep
belief in the practical significance of what it says and does. This at-
titude is coupled with a certain modesty of self and position: the
judicial statesman aspires to speak through the Court, not above it.
A dissent or separate concurrence comes only as a last resort, when
there is a division over principle, when the views of the majority are
fundamentally at odds with his. The judicial statesman is also a realist.
He understands that an authoritative position for the Court can only
be created through bargaining and compromise.
This is so because the Court is a committee, a collectivity, and
because the life tenure of Justices ensures that the committee will
in all likelihood be constituted by persons of widely disparate views.
At the time of Dombrowski the Court consisted of Justices appointed
by Presidents Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Kennedy; and through the
next decade we have had a Court with the appointees of Presidents
Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford, repre-
senting almost the whole panorama of major political currents in
modern America. In addition, with the increasing role of discretionary
jurisdiction, the questions addressed are almost by definition diffi-
cult; they are often politically sensitive and capable of a wide range
of resolutions. To obtain the votes necessary for the creation of an
authoritative decision, a Justice must almost inevitably bargain with
concessions. One Justice "announces" the opinion of the Court, but
he must state the views of five.
Concessions can take place on two distinct levels. One is the ex-
planatory level. For example, Dombrowski adopted the explanatory
system-the equitable language-of Douglas v. City of Jeannette. The
same could be said of the use of "Our Federalism" in Justice Rehn-
quist's opinions in Huffman and Rizzo, and in the Hicks and Littleton
opinions of Justice White. In each, a great deal more was at stake
than the Court was prepared to admit. Concessions can also occur at
a decisional level. In Dombrowski, for example, Justice Brennan de-
cided not to rule on the question whether § 1983 was an exception to
§ 2283, but instead chose to give § 2283 a chronological gloss (foot-
note 2); he decided to allow overbroad statutes to be applied retro-
spectively to those with fair warning (footnote 7); and he refused
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to rule on the constitutionality of the Communist Propaganda Con-
trol Law on the ground that the threat of prosecution was not im-
minent (footnote 13). Similarly, in Perez Brennan conceded to be
open the question whether federal relief would be appropriate if a
state prosecution, begun after a federal suit was filed, were pending
at the time of the federal hearing (footnote 9).
The concessions of the judicial statesman make vulnerable the
very precedent they create. They expose his reasoning to criticism,
both by the profession and by the other Justices. Thus in Younger
Justice Black used the footnote 7 of Dombrowski to impeach the
overbreadth branch of that decision. Concessions also provide doctrinal
building blocks that facilitate-though obviously do not cause-changes
in direction. For example, the continued use of the irreparable in-
jury requirement in Dombrowski facilitated Younger and Littleton;
Dombrowski's chronological gloss on § 2283 and footnote 9 of Perez
facilitated Hicks v. Miranda; the Perez-Steffel concession to the no-
prosecution-pending bar, when placed alongside the imminency re-
quirement conceded in footnote 13 of Dombrowski, created the squeeze
play, an analytic structure later used to deny access.
Concessions can also be faulted because of the frailty-one might
almost say the futility-of the bargains they create. The bargains are
often upset by personnel changes on the Court. Those of Dombrowski
were made vulnerable by the replacement of Warren, Fortas, and
Harlan, by Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. More surprisingly, those
of Younger, Hicks, and Huffman are threatened by Douglas's replace-
ment, Justice Stevens, who in the access cases of his first full Term,
Vail, Wooley, and Hernandez,192 wrote separately, revealing an un-
ease with the tenets of "Our Federalism" and displaying a moderation
that may make him more influential than Douglas with the other
Justices. It is also true that precedents are often overtaken by chang-
ing social contexts, which may lead some of the members of the
Court who are more tenuously tied to the bargain-such as Justices
Stewart and White-to change their views. They joined Dombrowski,
and yet in the 1970s lent their support to "Our Federalism." Justice
Stewart joined Younger, Huffman, Littleton, and Rizzo; Justice
White stood with Brennan in Younger, but joined Huffman and
Rizzo, and became the spokesman of the Burger Court in Hicks, Little-
ton, and Hernandez.
To point to the vulnerability of a judicial bargain is not to im-
peach the role of the judicial statesman. It is to admit the perilous
192. See notes 48 & 106 supra.
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quality of his work, but not to deny its value. The judicial statesman
seeks a Court resolution as a means of providing guidance to the bar,
the citizen, and the lower courts. Even more, he senses the impor-
tance of authoritative statements at a particular moment and is pre-
pared to act on that perception. The judicial statesman is neither de-
tached nor fatalistic. 1 3 Dombrowski, for example, must be in part
understood as an integral aspect of the attempt-the noble attempt
-of the Warren Court to protect the civil rights movement of the
mid-1960s, and in order to serve that function an authoritative reso-
lution was necessary. It would not have been sufficient for Justice
Brennan merely to have expressed his views. At the same time the
Justice realized that none of the concessions exacted by his brethren
could obscure Dombrowski's overarching message-the doors of the
federal equity court, long shut by Douglas v. City of Jeannette, were
now open.
Of course, decisions must be judged not simply by their effect
at the moment they are announced, but by how they will be used
as precedent. That judgment can be made in retrospect by a historian.
But a Justice can only act on assumptions about the balance of power
in the future. If a majority can hold together, even a precedent based
upon concessions can be used as a building block for a fuller and
less compromised decision or statement of principles. The animus of
Dombrowski, for all its concessions, permitted Justice Brennan in
Perez to free himself of the shackles of the irreparable injury doc-
trine of Douglas v. City of Jeannette and the ill-founded tradition of
using the language of equity to safeguard federal structure.
Speculation about the future is a matter of judgment; it is a gamble.
A majority can fall apart, and then concessions can serve as a bridge
to retrenchment-as did the no-prosecution-pending rule and the
shift from injunctions to declaratory judgments. Even then, however,
all is not in vain. Surely the retrenchment of the mid-1970s would
have been all the more devastating without the intervening precedent;
if, for example, the Burger Court could have built directly on Douglas
without having to work out from under Dombrowski. Without using
the equity language of Douglas, without the concessions of footnotes
2, 7, and 13, Dombrowski would have never been; without the con-
cession to the no-prosecution-pending bar, the shift to declaratory
judgments, and footnote 9, Perez would have never been; without
Perez there would have been no Steffel; and without Steffel, decisions
such as Salem Inn and Wooley would have been impossible, and not
193. See Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 213 (1964).
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a trace of Dombrowski would have remained in positive law-not a
trace of Justice Brennan's views of federalism and their implication
for federal anticipatory relief. The doors of the federal courts would
be closed tighter than they are.
Finally, just as we cannot assess the work of the judicial statesman
without benefit of hindsight, so we cannot evaluate it merely on the
basis of its effect on contemporary decisions. Just as it would be
wrong to assess Dombrowski solely from the perspective of 1965, it
would be wrong to assess it solely in terms of 1977. We must also
think about the future and speculate about the role Dombrowski
might have in shaping it. As precedent Dombrowski lends to the ideals
it expresses a strength and endurance beyond that which could attach
if they had been merely stated as opinion. The very fact that those
ideals have been actually implemented testifies to their practical va-
lidity, to their capacity to be realized, and to the commitment of
those who would have them realized-a lesson not easily forgotten.
Beyond all the axiomatic shifts from Brown to Younger, there con-
tinues to exist resistance to the retrenchment of the Burger Court-
on the Court, in the bar, in the lower federal courts, and perhaps
even more importantly, in the classroom. In those spheres Dombrowski
is a source of conscience. It is an authoritative reminder of a judicial
era that was and that could be.
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